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Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning
and Function of the Category of Disability
in Antidiscrimination Law
By Paula E. Berg'
To embrace one's braces and crutches would be an act of the grotesque; but
to permit one's humanity to be defined by others because of those braces and
crutches is even more grotesque
I. INTRODUcTION
At a well-publicized White House ceremony on July 26, 1990, thou-
sands of people with disabilities watched as President George Bush
signed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)2 into law, declaring,
"Let the shameful wall of exclusion finally come tumbling down."3 The
President's words captured the optimism of people with disabilities na-
tionwide that the enactment of the ADA, which extended federal anti-
discrimination protection to most private and public institutions,' would
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Award Program. I am grateful to Laura Gans and Lois Milne for their assistance with research
and to Gina Goldstein for her editorial suggestions and help in clarifying my ideas. Thanks also
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1. Leonard Kriegel, Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim: Some Reflections on the Cripple as Negro, 38
AM. SCHOLAR 412, 430 (1969).
2. P.L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994,
Supp. 1 1995, Supp. II 1996)).
3. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 140 (1994) (describing the public ceremony celebrating the signing of the
ADA).
4. See Peter David Blanck, Assessing Five Years of Employment Integration and Economic
Opportunity Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 19 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 384, 388 (1995) (finding high expectations about the ADA among people with disabilities
from 1990-92).
5. Before the ADA's enactment, federal protection against disability discrimination was
limited to the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (FRA), P.L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 710-797 (Law. Co-op. 1999)), which prohibited recipients of federal
financial assistance from discriminating in education, employment, physical accessibility, and the
conduct of any other program or activity, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
(FHA), P.L. No. 101-439, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994 &
Supp. I 1995)), which prohibited discriminating against the disabled in housing. In contrast to the
FRA, the ADA, which is not conditioned upon the receipt of federal funds, applies to virtually
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finally bring an end to the segregation and stigmatization of the disabled.6
Given the broad political consensus that produced the ADA and the
inclusion of most social institutions within its antidiscrimination mandate,
one might have predicted that the initial wave of decisions under the
statute would concentrate on whether an assortment of institutional prac-
tices discriminated on the basis of disability. 7 However, the conduct and
practices of defendants have not turned out to be the focus of much ADA
jurisprudence. Instead, a large percentage of ADA decisions are exclu-
sively concerned with whether plaintiffs are "disabled" within the mean-
ing of the law,s and the vast majority conclude that they are not, ordinar-
ily as a matter of law.9 In contrast, only a handful of judicial decisions
under the Federal Rehabilitation Act (FRA), which defines disability in
all private and public institutions. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994) (prohibiting disability
discrimination by private employers); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)
(prohibiting disability discrimination by providers of public services); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189
(1994 & Supp. 1 1995) (prohibiting disability discrimination by private entities operating public
accommodations and services).
6. In considering the need for the ADA, Congress found that, despite the FRA and FHA,
people with disabilities "occupy an inferior status in our society," "are severely disadvantaged
socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally," and are "relegated to a position of po-
litical powerlessness .. . resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative" of individual
ability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6)-(7) (1994). For a detailed statistical analysis of the social and
economic effects of disability discrimination, see UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 27-40 (1983) (describing
socio-economic status of people with disabilities); Blanck, supra note 4, at 389 (estimating that
50-90% of people with disabilities are unemployed).
7. The ADA passed 91 to 6 in the Senate, see 136 CONG. REC. 17,376 (1990), and 377 to 28
in the House of Representatives, see 136 CONG. REC. 17,296-97 (1990).
8. Between 1995 and 1997, ADA decisions concerning whether the plaintiff was disabled
outnumbered by about 2 to 1 decisions concerning defendants' employment decisions, and out-
numbered by about 3 to 2 decisions concerning defendants' failure to provide reasonable ac-
commodations. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS (BNA) CUMULATIVE DIGEST AND INDEX
TO AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES CASES, 1995-1997, passim (1997).
9. One study of 60 ADA decisions found that between 1991 and 1995 only 20% of plaintiffs
were deemed disabled within the meaning of the statute. See Courts Continuing Narrow Inter-
pretation of 'Disability': Case Study Shows, DISABILITY COMPLIANCE BULL., Mar. 27, 1997, at
10. Another study of 110 decisions found that only 6% of the plaintiffs were deemed disabled.
See id. Commentators have advanced a variety of theories to explain restrictive interpretations
of the ADA's definition of disability. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf, "Substantially Limited" Pro-
tection from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the
Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 414, 438-513 (1997) (arguing that the "special
treatment approach" has resulted in overly restrictive interpretation of ADA's definition of dis-
ability); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 101-02 (1999) (arguing that judicial abuse of summary judgment has re-
sulted in an excessive number of dismissals on the ground that plaintiff is not disabled under the
ADA); Stephen S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of Dis-
ability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107, 108 (1997) (arguing
that courts have narrowly construed ADA's definition of disability in response to the perception
that too many people with minor conditions were qualifying as disabled); Arlene Mayerson,
Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L.
REV. 587, 587 (1997) (arguing that judicial interpretation of ADA's definition of disability is in-
consistent with congressional intent).
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the very same manner as the ADA,' ° concern whether plaintiffs are dis-
abled, and a majority of these conclude that they are." This trend culmi-
nated during the 1998-99 term of the Supreme Court, with three decisions
that adopted some of the most restrictive interpretations of the ADA's
definition of disability by the lower courts.
12
The unexpected focus of ADA decisions on plaintiffs and their im-
pairments raises a number of questions that cannot adequately be an-
swered within the analytical confines of disability discrimination law. For
example: What epistemological assumptions about the nature of disabil-
ity underlie judicial construction of a highly restrictive category of dis-
ability that excludes many physical and mental conditions from its
bounds? Why do courts, as a precondition for obtaining judicial review,
subject all plaintiffs claiming disability discrimination to a detailed in-
quiry into the precise ways in which their impairment limits their bodily
functions and daily lives? How does this restrictive category of disability
allocate responsibility for maintaining health and managing the conse-
quences of illness and disability between individuals and society as a
whole? Finally, what is the relationship between the narrow category of
disability in antidiscrimination law and the legal system's larger role in
legitimizing existing social and economic relations?
10. Under the Federal Rehabilitation Act, an "individual with a disability" is a person who
has "a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one of more of such person's
major life activities; has a record of such impairment; or is regarded as having such an impair-
ment." 29 U.S.C.S. § 705(20)(B)(i)-(iii) (1999). Under the ADA, a disability is defined as "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities...
; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994).
11. Before the ADA was enacted in 1990, only a handful of decisions under the FRA con-
cerned whether the plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of that statute. See BUREAU OF
NATIONAL AFFAIRS (BNA) INDEX AND CUMULATIVE DIGEST TO FAIR EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES CASES, 1935-1975 (1975), passim; BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS (BNA) INDEX
AND CUMULATIVE DIGEST TO FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES CASES, 1975-1979 (1979), pas-
sim; BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS (BNA) INDEX AND CUMULATIVE DIGEST TO FAIR
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES CASES, 1979-1983 (1983), passim; BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS
(BNA) INDEX AND CUMULATIVE DIGEST TO FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES CASES, 1983-1988
(1988), passim; BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS (BNA) INDEX AND CUMULATIVE DIGEST TO
FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES CASES, 1988-1993 (1993), passim. Indeed, in 1984, more than a
decade after the FRA's enactment, a court managed to identify only one decision finding that a
plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of that statute. See Tudyman v. United Airlines,
Inc., 608 F. Supp. 739, 745 (C.D. Cal. 1984). However, after the ADA was enacted, there was a
dramatic increase in the number of FRA decisions that exclusively concerned whether the plain-
tiff was disabled. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS (BNA) INDEX AND CUMULATIVE
DIGEST TO FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES CASES, 1988-1993 (1993).
12. See Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999) (holding that there are no per
se impairments under the ADA and that all plaintiffs, irrespective of their impairment, must
prove that they are disabled); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999) (holding
that plaintiffs whose impairments are ameliorated by medical treatment are not disabled under
the ADA); Murphy v. UPS, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999) (holding that plaintiffs who establish that de-
fendant perceived them as unable to perform one job, but not a broad class of jobs, are not dis-
abled under the ADA).
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In seeking answers to these questions, this article will investigate the
epistemological, moral, and political assumptions underlying the category
of disability in antidiscrimination law. 13 A central premise is that the cate-
gory of disability, like legal categories generally,14 is a social construct
that performs specific functions within the broader context of the law's
legitimizing and naturalizing effect. 5 As Kimberle Williams Crenshaw
explains,
Law is an essential feature in the illusion of necessity because it embodies and
reinforces ideological assumptions about human relations that people accept
as natural or even immutable. People act out their lives, mediate conflicts,
and even perceive themselves with reference to the law. By accepting the
bounds of law and ordering their lives according to its categories and rela-
tions, people think that they are confirming reality-the way things must be.
Yet by accepting the view of the world implicit in the law, people are also
bound by its conceptual limitations.16
The definition of disability in antidiscrimination law is part of a larger
cultural discourse that establishes and upholds dominant notions of
health, illness, and disability while imposing a particular set of expecta-
tions upon individuals deemed to occupy each class. 7 Specifically, the re-
strictive category of disability reflects and reinforces the notion that dis-
ability is an objective biomedical phenomenon that constitutes an
essential aspect of the individual. In keeping with this assumption, a prin-
cipal function of the category of disability is not to inquire into the exis-
13. A major source of inspiration for this article was Deborah Stone's The Disabled State,
which advocates interrogating standards for determining disability to "examine how particular
constructs and measures systematically exclude certain understandings and include others, how
they serve the political interests of some groups at the expense of others, and how they work to
produce particular types of policy results." DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 117
(1984).
14. See ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAw 231 (1997) ("Law veils its own power ... by pre-
tending to find what it in fact makes itself. Law pretends to be able to allocate burdens of proof
because of natural facts . ... The natural is always ... a social construction, however, and un-
available as a source of differentiation that is found, not made."); Richard Delgado, Norms and
Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 943
(1991) ("We assign the things their weights, and then pretend that it is the scale that gives us the
information."); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimi-
nation Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (1978)
(explaining that law functions to legitimize existing social relations).
15. See STONE, supra note 13, at 26-27 (1984) (describing disability as a socially constructed
category that represents a politically fashioned compromise about the legitimacy of claims to
social aid).
16. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment. Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1351-52 (1988).
17. For a general discussion of the hegemonic effect of definitions of illness and disability,
see PETER CONRAD & JOSEPH W. SCHNEIDER, DEVIANCE AND MEDICALIZATION 23 (1992)
("[In modern industrial society, only law and medicine have the legitimacy to construct and
promote deviance categories with wide-ranging application."); STONE, supra note 13, at 4 ("The
very act of defining a disability category determines what is expected of the nondisabled-what
injuries, diseases, incapacities, and problems they will be expected to tolerate in their normal
working lives.").
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tence of prejudice or an exclusionary physical environment, but rather to
establish the exact nature and severity of the impairment itself, because it
is the impairment-not the environment-that is seen as the root cause of
the social and economic problems faced by the disabled individual.
From a normative standpoint, the category of disability generally re-
inforces the cult of individualism and, in particular, the dominant Ameri-
can ideology that matters of health and illness are properly the responsi-
bility of the individual, not the social collective. Additionally, while it
provides a mechanism for remedying some individual instances of dis-
crimination, this category sustains the stigmatized status of disability by
reaffirming the superiority of the healthy "normal" body and by negating,
objectifying, and depoliticizing the disabled subject. Finally, despite its
indifference to many of the harshest manifestations of disability bias,
anti-discrimination law helps to create the veneer of a society and labor
market that are rational, highly responsive to the needs of people with
disabilities, and singularly concerned with individual merit.
Part II of this Article examines the meaning of disability in antidis-
crimination law through the lens of four dominant theoretical paradigms.
Part III interrogates the norms and values that underlie and are rein-
forced by the construction of disability within antidiscrimination law. Part
IV analyzes the regressive effects of the restrictive category of disability
on antidiscrimination law's purported objectives of eradicating disability
bias and ending the stigmatization of people with disabilities.
II. THE MEANING OF DISABILITY IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
A. Theories of Disability
Social theorists have developed several theoretical paradigms to ex-
plain how disability has been conceptualized historically in Western so-
cieties. 8 Before the ascendancy of modem science and the medical pro-
fession, both illness and disability were largely viewed as the external
expression of an individual's sinfulness and moral impurity. 9 Consistent
18. For a comprehensive analysis of these paradigms, see generally JEROME E. BICK-
ENBACH, PHYSICAL DISABILITY AND SOCIAL POLICY (1993); Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination
Laws and Social Research on Disability: The Minority Group Perspective, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 41
(1996).
19. See generally BICKENBACH, supra note 18, at 143 ("Highly visible impairments were at
one time thought to be literally stigmatic, that is, signs of sinful and blameworthy behaviour.");
FRANK G. BOWE, HANDICAPPING AMERICA 2-16 (1978) (tracing the history of attitudes toward
the disabled); SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR (1978) (analyzing the moralization of
disease, particularly tuberculosis and cancer); Renee C. Fox, The Medicalization and Demedi-
calization of American Society, 106 DAEDALUS 9, 11 (1977) (arguing that, in an earlier age, devi-
ance was considered sinful rather than sick and therefore under the aegis of religious authorities
Yale Law & Policy Review
with this view, conformity with society's moral strictures was prescribed• • 20
as the "cure" for mental and physical impairments. In the case of those
individuals whose physical and mental nonconformity persisted, stigma,
segregation, punishment, and even elimination were considered appro-
priate.2
Moral theories continue to influence popular and legal constructions
of disability to this day.22 However, the modern era has been dominated
by a biomedical paradigm that conceives of disability as a material rather
than a moral attribute of the individual.23 Accordingly, the focus of this
perspective is the impairment itself, which is viewed as a "defect, defi-
ciency, dysfunction, abnormality, failing, or medical problem. ''24 Consis-
tent with its positivist roots, the biomedical model presumes that disabil-
ity can be ascertained by neutral scientific methods that, once applied,
yield a determination of disability that is acontextual and universal 25
While illness and disability are both regarded as objective defects, illness
is a bodily abnormality that is within the power of medicine to correct,
while disability is permanently beyond the curative capacity of medical
science.
The medicalization of disability was emancipatory in the sense that it
severed the causal link between disability and individual fault.26 However,
it also imposed its own hierarchy and coercive norms. 27 The biomedical
model conceives of all problems associated with a disability as the natural
and inevitable results of being impaired. The disabled are viewed as vic-
to diagnose and to control).
20. For an interesting analysis of volitional explanations of illness and disability, see
CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, EXPLAINING EPIDEMICS AND OTHER STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF
MEDICINE 274 (1992) ("The desire to explain sickness and death in terms of volition-of acts
done or left undone-is ancient and powerful. The threat of disease provides a compelling rea-
son to find prospective reassurance in aspects of behavior subject to individual control.").
21. See Judith Goodwin Greenwood, History of Disability as a Legal Construct, in DIS-
ABILITY EVALUATION 5, 5 (Stephen L. Demeter et al. eds., 1996) ("Throughout history disabil-
ity and impairment have been unwanted human conditions; therefore, they have been the subject
of miraculous recoveries (Jesus healed the lame and the blind) or they have caused ostracism
and even punishment (disabled and impaired persons in concentration camps were the first to be
exterminated in Nazi Germany).").
22. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., BICKENBACH, supra note 18, at 61 (stating that disability is most commonly
understood as a medical phenomenon); SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE
AND IDENTITY 46 (1998) ("The modernist 'solution' to disability was the... medicalization of all
responses to disability.").
24. BICKENBACH, supra note 18, at 61.
25. See CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 35 (arguing that the medical model is as-
sumed to have a scientific basis that is morally neutral).
26. See id. at 246 ("[M]edicalization is related to a longtime humanitarian trend in the con-
ception and control of deviance.").
27. See id. at vi ("The medicalization of social problems ... is not the culmination of a
movement to find a solution to the problems but only another period in which one imputed real-
ity is substituted for another.").
Vol. 18:1, 1999
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tims with special needs whose only hope for a "normal" life is compliance
with medical treatment, rehabilitation, and adaptation.28 Individuals with
impairments are consigned to the "sick role" within the social order and
within the structure of their relationships with medical professionals. 9 In
this role, they are released from some social responsibilities and are con-
sidered entitled to charity so long as they view their condition as undesir-
able and strive to overcome its limiting effects. 0 As one commentator has
explained,
The damage done by this medical model of disability has been considerable.
If an individual is defined by his or her inability to overcome a disability, he
or she is viewed as a failure if unable to do so. Instead of seeing the forces
outside the body, outside the impairment, outside the self, as essential to the
disabled person's successful negotiation with an often hostile society (whether
the barriers be financial, physical, or discriminatory), this view of disability,
where cure and eradication of difference are the paramount goals, puts the
blame squarely on the individual when a physical impairment cannot be over-
come.
By promoting the notion that disability is an inherent individual de-
fect, the biomedical model views people with disabilities as unwanted
reminders of the vulnerability of the body that all humans inhabit, and of
the limited curative capacity of modern medicine.2 Moreover, this para-
28. See BICKENBACH, supra note 18, at 90:
Since the [biomedical] model does not represent the social environment as being part of
the problem of disablement, it both fosters and authorizes the assumption that obsta-
cles are given and cannot, or need not, be altered to accommodate people with disabili-
ties . . . . [T]he only consistent social strategy for disablement policy is that of meeting
the "special" and individualized medical needs of the "patient."
See also Robert Funk, Disability Rights: From Caste to Class in the Context of Civil Rights, in
IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 7, 7 (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987)
("Historically, the inferior economic and social status of disabled people has been viewed as the
inevitable consequence of the physical and mental differences imposed by disability."); Harlan
Hahn, Civil Rights for Disabled Americans: The Foundation of a Political Agenda, in IMAGES OF
THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES, supra, at 181, 181 ("From the clinical perspective of medi-
cine, efforts to improve the functional capacities of individuals were regarded as the exclusive
solution to disability.
29. The concept of the "sick role" was originated by Talcott Parsons within the context of
his analysis of the sociology of medicine. See TALCOTr PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 428-79
(1951). For discussion of the applicability of this concept to the social condition of individuals
with disabilities, see Gerben DeJong, Independent Living: From Social Movement to Analytic
Paradigm, 60 ARCHIVES OF PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 435, 440-441 (1979)
(discussing how the sick role enforces dependency of people with disabilities); Alan Gartner &
Tom Joe, Introduction to IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES, supra note 28, at 4
(describing the relationship between the sick role and the social exclusion of the disabled).
30. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 19, at 15 ("So long as [the sick person] does not abandon him-
self to illness or eagerly embrace it, but works actively on his own and with medical professionals
to improve his condition, he is considered to be responding appropriately, even admirably, to an
unfortunate occurrence.").
31. Kenny Fries, Introduction to STARING BACK: THE DISABILITY EXPERIENCE FROM
INSIDE OUT 1, 6-7 (Kenny Fries ed., 1997).
32. See David T. Mitchell & Sharon L. Snyder, Introduction to THE BODY AND PHYSICAL
DIFFERENCE 1, 4 (David T. Mitchell & Sharon L. Snyder eds., 1997) (stating that the view of the
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digm largely consigns individuals with disabilities to a position of passiv-
ity and dependence. Since disability is understood as a scientific fact, the
entire domain-from determining its existence to prescribing its man-
agement-becomes the exclusive province of medical professionals.33
Thus, as managers of the impairment, medical experts occupy a role in
the lives of people with disabilities that reinforces their separateness and
passivity. 4 One commentator has stated that, while disability according to
the biomedical perspective "may no longer be viewed as the mark of sin-
fulness, it is still a stigma of inferiority, neediness, and dependence."35
With the rise of the social welfare state after the Second World War, a
third paradigm of disability arose that greatly influenced public policy
and legal definitions of disability. This is the economic model, which
views disability as a phenomenon that lies at the intersection of human
impairment and the market for labor.36 Specifically, disability is under-
stood as an impairment's limiting effect on an individual's functional ca-
pacity, and it is assessed according to how much it restricts a person from
performing activities deemed central to work.37 Unlike the medical para-
digm, the economic model does not conceive of disability as an objective,
acontextual fact within the body of the individual. Rather, it is under-
stood as a socio-economic construct that is determined by the relation-
ship between the impairment and the demands of the labor market.
The limited objective underlying the economic model is to promote
the economic self-sufficiency of individuals with disabilities by increasing
their participation in compensated labor. In this narrow sense, the eco-
nomic model is emancipatory. However, the goal of promoting economic
disabled as beyond cure "determines disability's unnatural status in medical and social discourse:
people with disabilities are said to be fated or unsalvageable and, thus, somehow stubbornly in-
human"); Susan Wendell, Toward a Feminist Theory of Disability, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES
READER 260, 270 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 1997):
As long as we cling to this belief that patients who cannot be 'repaired'-the chroni-
cally ill, the disabled, and the dying-will symbolize the failure of medicine and more,
the failure of the Western scientific project to control nature. They will carry this stigma
in medicine and in the culture as a whole.
33. See CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 241-45.
34. See DeJong, supra note 29, at 440 ("A constant medical presence in the lives of disabled
persons is said to entail behavior on the part of both medical practitioners and patients that in-
duce dependency..."); Funk, supra note 28, at 13 (arguing that the medical/rehabilitation model
perpetuates a dependent and nonparticipatory role of the patient in relation to the professional
and society as a whole).
35. BICKENBACH, supra note 18, at 143.
36. See Richard K. Scotch & Edward D. Berkowitz, One Comprehensive System? A Histori-
cal Perspective on Federal Disability Policy, 1 J. OF DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 2, 2 (1990) (stating
that disability has been defined during the twentieth century in terms of how an individual's
physical or mental attributes affect his or her ability to participate in work force).
37. See BICKENBACH, supra note 18, at 103 ("The [economic] model represents people with
disabilities as people with an economic problem, those who by virtue of the social reception of an
impairment experience a limitation upon their repertoire of productive capacity.").
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self-sufficiency is subordinate to the model's organizing principle, which
is economic efficiency. Accordingly, programmatic steps to increase the
participation of the disabled in the labor market by, for example, prohib-
iting discrimination or compelling workplace modifications, are justified
only if the cost of such measures is less than their economic benefit. If the
opposite is true-that is, if the market saves money by excluding the dis-
abled from the labor market-the model holds that it is socially desirable
for the disabled to remain unemployed and to receive direct income sup-
port payments from the state."'
The most recent conceptualization of disability is a product of social
justice movements and post-modern social theories that have emerged
over the past twenty-five years.39 This social-political model rejects the
premise of the moral and biomedical perspectives that disability is inher-
ent within the individual. Like the economic model, it understands dis-
ability as contextual and relational. However, rather than making the la-
bor market the exclusive determinant of the meaning of disability, the
social-political paradigm understands disability as a broader social con-
struct reflecting society's dominant ideology and cultural assumptions.
40
While it acknowledges the existence of biologically based differences, the
social-political model locates the meaning of these differences-and the
individual's experience of them as burdensome-in society's stigmatizing
attitudes and biased structures rather than in the individual.4 ' As one
commentator explains, disabilities "are socially constructed phenomena
brought about by attitudes toward people with disabilities which, once
embedded in social practices and institutions, sustain the disadvantageous
social condition of people with disabilities., 42
38. For a critique of the ADA that rests upon an economic approach to problem of disabil-
ity, see Carolyn L. Weaver, Incentives vs. Controls in Federal Disability Policy, in DISABILITY &
WORK: INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 3 (Carolyn L. Weaver, ed., 1991) (arguing
that employers should not be required to accommodate disabled employees unless the cost of
doing so is less than the benefit). Cf Sue A. Krenek, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72
TEx. L. REV. 1969 (1994) (arguing that the government should subsidize employers of persons
with disabilities to mitigate the economic costs of accommodation).
39. See BICKENBACH, supra note 18, at 135-158 (describing theoretical and political origins
of the social-political model of disability).
40. See Greenwood, supra note 21, at 5 ("The definitions of disability expand and contract
more along political and ideological lines than according to any clear physical determinations.").
41. See UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 89 ("Impairments in
physical and mental abilities undeniably exist, but the degree to which they control a person's
participation in society is as much inherent in the social context as in the impairment."); DeJong,
supra note 29, at 443 ("The locus of the problem is not the individual but the environment that
includes not only the rehabilitation process but also the physical environment and the social con-
trol mechanisms in society-at-large."); Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences: Dis-
ability and Discrimination, 44 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 39, 40 (1988) ("From a socio-political vantage
point, the difficulties confronted by disabled persons are viewed as largely the result of the disa-
bling environment instead of personal defects or deficiencies.").
42. BICKENBACH, supra note 18, at 13.
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Consistent with its central premise that disability is in the culturally
constructed eye of the beholder, the social-political paradigm rejects the
notion that disability can be determined by value-free scientific methods.
Instead, the designation of some persons as disabled and others as"normal" is viewed as "the false dichotomization of a continuum., 43 As
the U.S. Civil Rights Commission has stated,
Most popular conceptions and official usages of the term "handicapped" are
based on the idea that there are observable physical and mental conditions
called "handicaps," that the people denominated handicapped are signifi-
cantly impaired in ways that distinguish them from "normal" nonhandicapped
people and that one either is or is not handicapped. The underlying reality,
however, is not so easily categorized. Instead of two distinct classes
(handicapped and normal), there are spectrums of physical and mental abili-
ties that range from superlative to minimal or nonfunctional.
44
Thus, instead of viewing determinations of disability as neutral and uni-
versal, the social-political perspective regards them as cultural and politi-
cal artifacts, even when made by medicine or law.
Most significantly, the socio-political model prescribes a revolutionary
approach to alleviating the adverse social and economic consequences of
disability. It does not seek to change the individual through medical
treatment, rehabilitation, adaptation, or the enforcement of moral stric-
tures, as the medical and moral models do. Nor does it condition human
dignity and social equality upon market efficiency, as the economic
model does.4 ' Rather, the socio-political model holds that people with
disabilities are no less deserving than the able-bodied of a social structure
and physical environment that meets their needs. Accordingly, it seeks to
transform attitudes and alter the physical environment to accommodate
the wide spectrum of abilities within the population.4 ' As Harlan Hahn
explains, "the functional capacities required of men and women by the
current organization of social life has not been decreed by natural law.
Environments can be changed so that they necessitate greater or lesser
amounts of individual ability., 47
43. Greenwood, supra note 21, at 9.
44. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 87.
45. For a detailed critique of the economic model of disability, see BICKENBACH, supra note
18, at 133, in which he argues that the economic model ignores non-economic costs of disability
discrimination and is premised upon the assumption that individuals in need do not have a claim
to social resources unless society derives an economic benefit from meeting those needs.
46. See id. at 161-62 ("In the social-political model disablement is not ... a brute fact about
the world, it is a social problem amenable to social solutions ... the realization that as a society
we create and sustain handicap situations is the central virtue, and emancipatory message, of the
social-political model.").
47. Harlan Hahn, Disability Policy and the Problem of Discrimination, 28 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 293, 297 (1985).
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B. The Meaning of Disability in Antidiscrimination Law
All four of the theories of disability described in the previous section
of this article find expression in the text of the ADA. For example, the
moral model underlies the express exclusion of an assortment of histori-
cally stigmatized differences such as transvestism, transexualism, and
kleptomania from the ADA's definition of disability. 48 These exclusions
deny these differences medical legitimacy and sustain their construction
as personal moral failings that must be eradicated by conformity with
49prevailing behavioral norms.
Individuals who are not expressly excluded from the ADA must es-
tablish that they have a "disability" as defined by the statute. The so-
called "actual" disability prongs of the definition state that an individual
with a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities, or an individual with a record of such an im-
pairment, is disabled within the meaning of the law. 50 The definition's
"regarded as" prong provides that an individual who is "regarded as
having such an impairment" is also disabled and entitled to the protec-
tions of the Act.5
1
The "actual" disability prongs of the ADA largely reflect the bio-
medical and economic paradigms. The requirement of a physical or men-
tal impairment (or the record of such) focuses on the existence or nonex-
istence of a physiological or psychological disorder within the body or
mind of the individual.52 Additionally, the requirement that the impair-
ment substantially limit a major life activity combines the biomedical
model's focus on the functional effect of an impairment with the eco-
nomic model's emphasis on the relationship between the impairment and
the activities required by work.53
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (1994) (expressly excluding transvestism, transexualism, pedo-
philia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impair-
ments, other sexual behavioral disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and
psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs from the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act).
49. For an analysis of the politics that led to these exclusions, see Robert Burgdorf, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second Generation Civil Rights
Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 529 (1991), demonstrating that exclusions were in-
cluded in the final version of ADA in order to obtain support of the Bush Administration and
Congressional conservatives.
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(B) (1994).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(B) (1994); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1998) (describing
physiological and mental disorders and conditions that constitute impairments).
53. Neither the FRA nor the ADA defines major life activities. However, ADA regulations
specify examples of major life activities, such as manual tasks, walking, seeing, speaking, sitting,
standing, lifting, and reaching, which are implicated in many types of work. See 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(i) (1998). Additionally, the regulations specify that working is a major life activity. See id.
Examples of major life activities in the regulations, however, are not limited to work-related
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It is the social-political perspective, however, that lies at the heart of
disability discrimination law. 4 The ADA's findings and purposes section
recognizes that bias and stigma are chief causes of the economic impov-
erishment and political powerlessness of people with disabilities.5" The
social-political paradigm also underlies several of the ADA's provisions.
For example, the "regarded as" prong of its definition of disability rests
on the proposition that even when a mental or physical condition is not
itself substantially limiting, bias and stereotypes can cause the individual
to be perceived as disabled and treated differently. 6 In explaining the
purpose of the "regarded as" prong of the definition of disabled con-
tained in the FRA, which is identical to the ADA's,57 the Supreme Court
stated,
By amending the definition of "handicapped individual" to include not only
those who are actually physically impaired, but also those who are regarded
as impaired and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major life ac-
tivity, Congress acknowledged that society's myths and fears about disability
and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from
actual impairment. 8
The ADA's concept of reasonable accommodation is likewise
grounded in the social-political premise that disabilities are created and
maintained by an environment that fails to meet the needs of all of soci-
ety's members. Thus, the ADA affirmatively requires the creation of an
environment that accommodates the range of physical capabilities among
society's members.5 9 Within the workplace, this mandate compels em-
ployers to negotiate with disabled employees about their individual needs
and to alter existing conditions to meet those needs. 6° The failure to pro-
functions. For example, the regulations provide that the caring for oneself is a major life activity.
See id.
54. See Hahn, supra note 18, at 46. ("The aim of [antidiscrimination] statutes and the socio-
political perspectives is to foster conditions in which disabled and nondisabled persons can oc-
cupy positions in society on a basis of genuine equality.").
55. The ADA's findings recognize that disability discrimination has prevented people with
disabilities from fully participating in society and competing on an equal basis. See 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(2)-(9) (1994).
56. See Howard v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 904 F. Supp. 922, 929-30 (E.D. Wis. 1995)
(stating that the "regarded as" prong of the ADA "is designed to combat invidious stereotypes
regarding disabled members of society").
57. See supra note 10.
58. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,284 (1986).
59. Title I of the ADA requires employers to make facilities physically accessible and to re-
structure jobs, acquire equipment, or otherwise modify policies and practices to enable an oth-
erwise qualified disabled person to function on the job. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994). Title II
requires operators of public services to alter facilities to enable the full participation of qualified
disabled persons. See 42 U.S.C. § 12147. Title III requires private entities that operate public ac-
commodations to modify policies, practices, and procedures to afford access and participation by
persons with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
60. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reason-
able Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 38-39 (1996):
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vide an accommodation is itself unlawful discrimination under the Act.6'
The ADA's concept of reasonable accommodation, however, is tem-
pered by the economic model's core premise that inequality is acceptable
if it would be economically inefficient to eliminate it. 2 Accordingly, an
accommodation or modification is not required under the ADA if it
would impose an undue hardship or fundamentally alter the nature of the
good, service, facility, or privilege provided.63 This qualification reflects
the judgment that disability bias is a lesser evil than economic ineffi-
ciency.
Despite its centrality to antidiscrimination law, courts have largely es-
chewed the socio-political perspective when determining whether a plain-
tiff claiming discrimination is disabled and therefore entitled to legal pro-
tection. Instead, they have remained firmly entrenched in an essentialist
biomedical understanding of disability, which has resulted in the fabrica-
tion of an extremely narrow category of disability. 6
1. Interpretation of the "Regarded As" Prong
Judicial rejection of the social-political approach is most apparent in
decisions interpreting the "regarded as" prong of the definition of dis-
ability, which constitutes the most unambiguous expression of this para-
digm in the ADA. In construing the "regarded as" prong, courts have
rejected the paradigm's bedrock premise that any physical or mental dif-
ference can be a disability if it is viewed as such by others because of
stereotypes or fear. Instead, they have fixed their gaze on the biomedical
nature and severity of the perceived impairment. Judicial acceptance of
the notion that there is an essential truth about disability that either does
or does not exist within the body of the individual underlies Forrisi v.
Bowen, 6' a seminal opinion interpreting the "regarded as" prong. In thisdecision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the purpose of
Rather than taking job descriptions as a given, reasonable accommodation doctrine
asks how the job might be modified to enable more individuals to perform it. The doc-
trine asks the employer to accommodate the job to the individual, rather than de-
manding that individuals accommodate themselves to the job or forgo it altogether.
61. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B), 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), (iii), (iv) (1994).
62. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (stating that employers are not required to make ac-
commodations if they would impose an "undue hardship" on the operation of the business); 42
U.S.C. § 12143 (c)(4) (stating that modifications are not required if they would impose an"undue financial burden" on public entities); 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (stating that
private operators of public accommodations and services are not required to make accommoda-
tions or modifications if they would fundamentally alter the nature of goods or services or im-
pose an "undue burden"). Like the economic model of disability, these provisions place a higher
value on economic efficiency than equality.
64. See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
65. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
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antidiscrimination law is to ensure
that truly disabled, but genuinely capable, individuals will not face discrimina-
tion in employment because of stereotypes about the insurmountability of
their handicaps. It would debase this high purpose if the statutory protections
available to those truly handicapped could be claimed by anyone whose dis-
ability was minor and whose relative severity of impairment was widely
shared.
Biomedical assumptions about disability have led to the contrivance
of principles that seek to distinguish between perceived disabilities that
are "truly" disabling and those that are not. The practical result has been
the imposition of burdensome evidentiary requirements that are funda-
mentally inconsistent with the social-political origins of the "regarded as"
prong of the ADA's definition of disability.
For example, courts have grafted the "actual" disability prong's re-
quirement of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity onto the "regarded as" prong of the definition. Thus, to
be protected under the "regarded as" prong, it is not sufficient for an in-
dividual to be discriminated against as a result of a real or imagined men-
tal or physical impairment. The defendant must also falsely perceive the
impairment to substantially limit one or more of the plaintiff's major life
activities, such as caring for him- or herself, performing manual tasks, or
67breathing.
Thus, unless the defendant's misapprehension concerning the plain-
tiff's physical or mental state happens to include the erroneous belief that
it limits a major life activity, no violation of antidiscrimination law can be
considered to have occurred. 68 For example, in Thompson v. Holy Family
66. Id. at 934 (emphasis added); see also EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405, 409
(S.D. Tex. 1997) (stating that the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's definition of disability is
intended "to protect people who have some obvious specific handicap that employers might gen-
eralize into a disability") (emphasis added). For an argument that inclusion of the "regarded as"
prong indicates that Congress did not intend to limit the ADA's protections to individuals who
were actually impaired, see Mayerson, supra note 9, at 611, in which she states that there would
be no reason to include the "regarded as" prong if the statute were intended only to protect
those who are truly disabled.
67. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149-50 (1999) (stating that for the
plaintiff to qualify as disabled under the regarded as prong, it must be shown that the defendant
either (1) "mistakenly believes that [plaintiff] has a physical impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities," or (2) "mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting im-
pairment substantially limits one or more major life activities").
68. See, e.g., Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 322 (5th Cir. 1997) (dismissing claim of"regarded as" discrimination because plaintiff failed to establish that defendant regarded his al-
coholism as substantially limiting major life activities); Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc.,
97 F.3d 876, 885 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defen-
dant regarded his health problem and mood swings as substantially limiting a major life activity);
Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, 85 F.3d 1311, 1320 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the
plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant regarded his high blood pressure, angina, and
coronary heart disease as a substantially limiting impairment); Lee v. Trustees of Dartmouth
College, 958 F. Supp. 37, 42 (D.N.H. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff claiming "regarded as" dis-
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S69Hospital, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a
claim of "regarded as" discrimination by a plaintiff with a back injury
who argued that her employer falsely believed her to be incapable of
lifting twenty-five pounds. According to the court, in order for the back
injury to have been perceived as a disability, the employer would have
had to imagine that it prevented the plaintiff from lifting less than twenty-
five pounds.70 The court considered only that particular perceived weight
limitation to be substantially limiting.
Similarly, in Rodriguez v. Loctite Puerto Rico, Inc.,7" a woman with
lupus erythematosis claimed that she was subjected to a hostile work en-
vironment because her employer underestimated the debilitating nature
of her disease and regarded her as a malingerer.72 Again, the court sought
to determine whether the plaintiff was "regarded as" disabled by exam-
ining the defendant's beliefs about the severity of the plaintiff's impair-
ment. According to the court, the plaintiff failed to establish disability
under the "regarded as" prong because the employer's misapprehension
of her condition, which caused him to believe that she was merely lazy,
established that he did not regard her as substantially limited in her abil-
ity to work.73
ability must show that the defendant, who thought plaintiff had multiple sclerosis, believed that
this condition substantially limited his ability to learn or perform manual tasks); South v. NMC
Homecare, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1336, 1341 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff failed to show
that the defendant believed that a nonexistent abdominal tumor substantially limited a major life
activity); Hites v. Patriot Homes, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 880, 884 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (holding that in
order to prove that an employer regarded an employee as disabled, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant "knew of his injury and believed that he was substantially limited because of the
injury"). Not all courts have read the requirement of a substantial limitation of a major life ac-
tivity into the "regarded as" prong. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States Postal Service, 946 F.2d
1214, 1216-18 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding that a plaintiff with degenerative disease in the back
and knee was "regarded as" disabled by his employer without analyzing whether the defendant
believed it substantially limited a major life activity); Olbrot v. Denny's Inc., No. 97 C 1578, 1998
WL 525174, at *3 (N.D. I11. Aug. 19, 1998) (finding that an employer's hostile remarks about the
plaintiff's cancer were sufficient to raise a material issue of fact as to whether the employer re-
garded the plaintiff as disabled); United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073,
1084 (W.D. Wisc. 1998) (stating that establishing disability under the "regarded as" prong turns
upon whether the defendant's allegedly prejudicial reactions limited a major life activity, not
whether the condition, as perceived, limited a major life activity); Gray v. Ameritech Corp., 937
F. Supp. 762, 770-71 (N.D. I11. 1996) (holding that a supervisor's mistaken belief that the plain-
tiff's psoriasis was contagious was sufficient to raise a material question of fact on whether plain-
tiff was "regarded as" disabled); Muller v. Hotsy Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1389, 1411-12 (N.D. Iowa
1996) (stating that an employer's perception that a spinal injury was disabling was sufficient to
raise a material issue of fact under the "regarded as" prong).
69. 121 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1997).
70. See id. at 541.
71. 967 F. Supp. 653 (D.P.R. 1997).
72. See id. at 659 (stating that her supervisors' misunderstanding about lupus, which caused
them to believe she was capable of doing more than she did, demonstrated that they did not con-
sider her substantially limited in any major life activities).
73. This tortured reasoning also underlies the decision in Van Sickle v. Automatic Data
Processing, Inc., No. 97-1255, 1998 WL 863707 (6th Cir. Nov. 23, 1998). In this case, the court
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Courts have insisted upon proof that the defendant subjectively be-
lieved that the plaintiff's condition substantially limited a major life ac-
tivity, even when the plaintiff's mental or physical condition is widely
stigmatized, the defendant held biased attitudes, and these attitudes
clearly led to the plaintiff's unequal treatment. For example, in EEOC v.
General Electric Company,4 the plaintiff claimed that he was disabled
under the "regarded as" prong because his employer falsely believed he
was infected with HIV. While acknowledging that the defendant's belief
was erroneous and that it led to the plaintiff's harassment, the court nev-
ertheless held that the latter was not "regarded as" disabled because he
had failed to establish the defendant's belief that HIV infection substan-
tially limited the plaintiff's ability to work or engage in another major life
activity.75 In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly disregarded the
social stigma associated with HIV/AIDS, stating, "the general public's
view of HIV/AIDS is irrelevant to the specific issues before this court.
[The plaintiff] must show that he was personally perceived to have a sub-
stantially limiting impairment, and that this perception was held by [the
defendant]."76
While this interpretation of the "regarded as" prong tips its hat to the
social-political perspective in recognizing that disability is a product of
the way in which a physical or mental difference is perceived by others,
its focus on the defendant's perception of the medical severity of the im-
pairment betrays its fundamental roots in the biomedical paradigm. In
77contrast, the EEOC's interpretation of the "regarded as" prong is more
consistent with the social-political origins of this provision, because it ac-
knowledges that an impairment can be rendered substantially limiting-
that is, disabling-solely through the false perceptions, mistaken assump-
78tions, or unsubstantiated fears of others.
rejected the argument that a supervisor's statement that "we will send in 'Scar Face' Van Sickle
to work on the tough deals" established that the plaintiff, who had a large facial scar, was per-
ceived as disabled. Rather, according to the court, this statement indicated the supervisor's con-
fidence in the plaintiff's ability to work. See id. at *3.
74. 17 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. Ind. 1998)
75. See id. at 831.
76. Id.
77. The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance to Title I states, regarded as having such an impair-
ment means:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life ac-
tivities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such a limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities
only as a result of the attitude of others toward such impairment,
(3) Has none of the impairments defined [above] but is treated by a covered entity as
having a substantially limiting impairment.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(l) (1998) (emphasis added).
78. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2 at 350 (1998) ("[I1f an individual can show that an
employer or other covered entity made an employment decision because of a perception of dis-
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Plaintiffs who claim that their work 9 is substantially limited due to a
perceived disability must meet an even higher burden, one that draws on
the economic model of disability. In these cases, it is not enough for
plaintiffs to establish that their employer mistakenly believed that a real
or perceived impairment precluded them from performing their job.8°
They must also establish that the employer regarded them as unqualified
to perform a broad class of jobs.81 Some courts require proof that the em-
ployer "see the individual as unqualified for an array of occupations. '
Meeting this burden requires either an admission by the defendant that
he or she believed the impairment prevented the plaintiff from perform-
ing a number of jobs," or proof that a substantial number of employers
ability based on 'myth, fear or stereotype,' the individual will satisfy the 'regarded as' part of the
definition of disability. If the employer cannot articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the
employment action, an inference that the employer is acting on the basis of 'myth, fear, or
stereotype' can be drawn.").
79. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998) (recognizing work as a major life activity).
80. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2151 (1999) ("When the major life
activity under consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase 'substantially limits' re-
quires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege that they are unable to work in a broad class of
jobs."); Murphy v. UPS, 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2139 (1999) ("[Iln light of petitioner's skills and the ar-
ray of jobs available to petitioner utilizing those skills, petitioner has failed to show that he is
regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs."). See also Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415,
1419 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that "an impairment that an employer perceives as limiting an in-
dividual's ability to perform only one job is not a handicap" under the FRA); Forrisi v. Bowen,
794 F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir. 1986) (rejecting notion that an individual could "become a handi-
capped individual" under the FRA only if "seen as unsuited for one position in one plant-and
nothing more").
81. See Dutcher v. Ingalls, 53 F.3d 723, 728 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a jury could not find
plaintiff, a welder, regarded as disabled because of insufficient proof that the defendant believed
her impairment would prevent her from performing welding functions generally); Forrisi v.
Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir. 1986) ("[Under the FRA] an employer regards an employee
as handicapped in his or her ability to work by finding the employer's impairment to foreclose
generally the type of employment involved."); Nedder v. Rivier College, 944 F. Supp. 111, 118
(D.N.H. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff must establish that the defendant believed that her obe-
sity prevented her from teaching generally); Duff v. Lobdell-Emery Mfg. Co., 926 F. Supp. 799,
806 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (stating that the proper test is whether the impairment, as perceived, would
affect the individual's ability to find work across the spectrum of same or similar jobs). A minor-
ity of courts require only that the plaintiff establish that a perceived disability substantially lim-
ited her ability to perform one job. See, e.g., Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.
1996) (holding that the plaintiff established a claim of "regarded as" discrimination by estab-
lishing that the defendant knew about his heart attack and hospitalization and fired him after
observing fatigue on the job); Butterfield v. New York State, No. 96Civ.5144, 1998 WL 401533 at
*12 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1998) (holding that the plaintiff can satisfy "regarded as" prong by show-
ing that the defendant discriminated against him because of attitudes about his obesity).
82. Smaw v. Virginia State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469, 1473 (E.D. Va. 1994). See also Smith v.
City of Des Moines 99 F.3d 1466, 1474 (8th Cir. 1996) (dismissing claim of "regarded as" dis-
crimination because the plaintiff, a firefighter, had not established that his employer believed
that he was unable to perform jobs other than firefighting); Motichek v. Buck Kriehs Co., 958 F.
Supp. 266, 270 (E.D. La. 1996) (dismissing claim of "regarded as" discrimination because plain-
tiff failed to establish that defendant regarded him as having an impairment that prevented him
from performing a broad class of jobs).
83. See, e.g., id. at 1475 (dismissing claim of "regarded as" discrimination because employer
did not indicate that it viewed plaintiff as unable to perform any job in law enforcement).
Yale Law & Policy Review
would share the defendant's mistaken belief about the limiting effect of
an impairment upon the plaintiff's ability to work.8 In one of the rela-
tively few of these claims to have survived summary judgment, a voca-
tional expert testified that the impairment, as perceived by the defendant,
would prevent the plaintiff from performing half of all unskilled jobs in
85the local economy.
Like the economic approach, this method of determining disability,
which has been dubbed the "one job is not enough" rule, focuses upon
the intersection between a perceived impairment and the labor market.
Plaintiffs are disabled under the "regarded as" prong only if they can es-
tablish that a perceived impairment significantly reduces their employ-
ability.8
2. Interpretation of the "Actual" Disability Prongs
The failure of courts to embrace the socio-political perspective has
similarly constrained interpretation of the "actual" disability prongs of
the ADA's definition of disability. Specifically, biomedically based as-
sumptions about the nature of disability have resulted in the construction
of a category of "actual" disability that excludes many individuals with a
host of debilitating and frequently misunderstood mental and physical
impairments.87 These decisions do more than merely deny such individu-
als protection against discrimination and the right to accommodation.
They also reproduce and legitimize the very theoretical paradigm that
has perpetuated the discredited and dependent status of people with dis-
abilities throughout the modern era.'
84. See, e.g., Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that plain-
tiff was not disabled under the "regarded as" prong because she failed to present evidence that
she would be precluded from performing not only the specific job for which she applied, but also
a wide range of jobs, if her ability to perform physical tasks was limited in the manner described
by the defendant).
85. See Scharff v. Frank, 791 F. Supp. 182, 186-87 (S.D. Ohio 1991) ("Assuming that the
plaintiff has the physical impairments that she is regarded as having by the defendants, the plain-
tiff's vocational expert estimates that the plaintiff would be prevented from performing ap-
proximately half of the unskilled jobs in the local economy that she would otherwise be qualified
to perform.").
86. Several articles have criticized this rule. See, e.g., R. Bales, Once Is Enough: Evaluating
When a Person Is Substantially Limited in Her Ability To Work, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 203, 235-
46 (1993) (arguing that proof of disability discrimination by one employer should satisfy burden
of proving substantial limitation on ability to work); Burgdorf, supra note 9, at 571-72 ("Properly
understood, the need to prove that one is 'disabled' is amply satisfied by proving that an em-
ployer purposefully inflicted a negative consequence upon an individual because of a physical or
mental impairment (whether real or perceived), thus satisfying the "regarded as" prong of the
definition."); Locke, supra note 9, at 109 (criticizing the overly burdensome requirements im-
posed on plaintiffs claiming a substantial limitation on ability to work).
87. See infra notes 93, 95, 97, 99-101.
88. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
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As previously explained, the biomedical model defines disability as a
functional impairment that is permanently beyond the corrective capacity
of medical science.89 Consistent with this view, courts routinely hold that
short-term mental and physical conditions are not disabilities under the
ADA,90 even though no such limitation appears in the text or legislative
history of the statute.9 ' Some courts have gone further by requiring that a
medical or psychological condition be permanent to be a disability.92 Ad-
ditionally, the Supreme Court recently rejected the conclusions of the
EEOC 9 and a majority of circuit courts,94 holding that individuals are not
89. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that
mental depression lasting months is not a disability under ADA); Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d
840, 844 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a temporary kidney obstruction is not a disability); Sanders
v. Arneson Prods., Inc. 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a cancer-related psycho-
logical condition that lasted less than four months is not a disability); Evans v. City of Dallas, 861
F.2d 846, 852-53 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a transitory knee injury is not a disability under
FRA); Kramer v. K&S Assocs., 942 F. Supp. 444, 446 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding that a broken leg
that healed within six months is not a disability); Pressutti v. Felton Brush, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 545,
548-49 (D.N.H. 1995) (holding that a temporary back condition is not a disability).
91. See Burgdorf, supra note 9, at 476 ("[T]he ADA legislative history offers not a trace of
support for ousting temporary impairments from the coverage of the ADA."). These decisions
are consistent with EEOC guidelines, which state that "temporary, non-chronic impairments of
short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities." 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (1998).
92. See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Permanency, not fre-
quency, is the touchstone of a substantially limiting impairment."); Rogers v. International Ma-
rine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a surgically corrected ankle
condition is not a disability); Muller v. Automobile Club, 897 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Cal. 1995)
(holding that a temporary psychological condition is not a disability); Rakestraw v. Carpenter
Co., 898 F. Supp. 386, 390 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (finding that a back injury that was corrected after
an employee's termination was not a disability); Blanton v. Winston Printing Co., 868 F. Supp.
804, 808 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (holding that a knee injury with minimal permanent residual effects is
not a disability).
93. According to the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance to Title I of the ADA, "[tihe determi-
nation of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a
case-by-case basis without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or pros-
thetic devices." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (1998). The Supreme Court is rather oppor-
tunistic in its approach to EEOC regulations defining disability under the ADA. When the Court
disagrees with the EEOC's interpretation, it disregards the agency and has even questioned its
authority to promulgate regulations on the subject. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.
Ct. 2139, 2145 (1999) ("No agency, however, has been given authority to issue regulations im-
plementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA."). On the other hand, when the
Court agrees with the EEOC, it readily invokes the agency's interpretation of the definition of
disability. See, e.g., id. at 2151 (applying EEOC criteria for determining whether an individual is
substantially limited in ability to work); Murphy v. UPS, 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2138-39 (1999)
(applying EEOC criteria to determine whether an individual is substantially limited in the major
life activity of working).
94. See Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that steps taken by plaintiff to compensate for learning impairment cannot be consid-
ered in determining disability); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-30 (7th Cir.
1998) (holding that diabetes that can be corrected by medication is a disability); Arnold v. UPS,
136 F.3d 854, 866 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that medically controllable diabetes is a disability);
Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that the
district court erred in finding plaintiff with medically controlled epilepsy not to be disabled);
Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff with impair-
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disabled if their symptoms are controlled by medication.95 This reasoning
has led lower courts to hold that asthma," heart disease,97 and diabetes"
are not disabilities.
All of these restrictive interpretations of the ADA rest on the premise
that disability is an objective biomedical phenomenon that renders an in-
dividual essentially "other." In accordance with this view, a person is not
disabled unless he or she is permanently beyond the reach of medicine
and different.99 These decisions reflect not only an essentialist approach
to disability but also the modernist faith in medical science and the domi-
nance of the medical profession within society.'" In these decisions, it is
medicine that defines whether or not an individual is disabled, not his or
her treatment by society.' 1 Disputing the assumption that successful
medical treatment necessarily transforms the way in which an individual
is perceived by others, and hence his or her social status, one court has
correctly explained that "[t]he individual is no less disabled, and no less
subject to discriminatory treatment, because he or she has made use of
the best available medical treatment.'102
ments that limited vision was disabled under ADA even though his brain had compensated for
and mitigated effects of condition); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.2d 516, 520-21 (11th
Cir. 1997) (disregarding ameliorative effect of medication on plaintiff's Graves disease in deter-
mining disability); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S.Ct. 1349 (stating that the effect of mitigating measures should not be considered in deter-
mination of disability).
95. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47 ("A person whose physical or mental impairment is cor-
rected by medication or other measures does not have an impairment that presently,substantially limits' a major life activity."); Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2138 (affirming circuit court
finding that petitioner's high blood pressure was not a disability because it was controlled by
medication).
96. See Gaddy v. Four B. Corp., 953 F. Supp. 331, 337 (D. Kan. 1997).
97. See Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 108 (D.R.I. 1997). See also
Murphy v. UPS, 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1999), affd 119 S. Ct. 2133 (U.S. 1999) (finding that
high blood pressure is not a disability because it is treated with medication).
98. See Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445-46 (W.D. Wis. 1996)
(finding that an insulin-dependent diabetic is not disabled under the ADA).
99. See EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405, 409 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (stating that the
ADA only covers conditions "affecting a specific functional capacity that are essentially incur-
able with current medical science").
100. For a discussion of the modernist faith in medicine, see CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra
note 17, at 241 ("In our society we want to believe in medicine, as we want to believe in religion
and our country; it wards off collective fears and reduces public anxieties." (citation omitted)).
101. See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) ("I do not believe
that Congress intended the ADA to protect as 'disabled' all individuals whose life activities
would hypothetically be substantially limited were they to stop taking medication."); Hodgens,
963 F. Supp. at 108 (stating that it is inconceivable that Congress intended determinations of dis-
ability under the ADA to be based on what an individual's ability "might be if he abandoned
reasonable treatment measures").
102. Hendler v. Intelecom USA, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). See also Fal-
lacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1997) ("The very fact that the [defendant] has
a requirement for uncorrected as well as for corrected vision recognizes that the availability of
corrective eyewear does not make a visual disability irrelevant."). An attempt by the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals to take a less dichotomous position on the effect of medication on deter-
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An inadequate appreciation of the social and political dimension of
disability is also reflected in decisions that automatically exclude from the
category of disability plaintiffs who have filed claims for public 3 or pri-
vate disability' insurance benefits. The conclusion that a person deter-
mined to be disabled within the context of one set of legal rules (such as
social security law)"5 cannot then be considered disabled within the con-
text of another set of legal rules (such as antidiscrimination law) reflects
the false neutrality of the biomedical paradigm in viewing determinations
mining disability under the ADA is no less embedded in essentialism. In Washington v. HCA
Health Services, 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998), the court held that only "serious impairments and
ailments," such as diabetes, epilepsy, and hearing impairments, can be considered in their un-
treated states, while all other conditions would not be considered disabling if ameliorated by
medicine. The court's distinction between serious and nonserious impairments presumes that the
former are always disabling (even when treated), while those it considers nonserious are never
disabling when treated. To be considered "serious," an impairment must require that the indi-
vidual "use mitigating measures on a frequent basis, that is, he must put on his prosthesis (sic)
every morning or take his medication with some continuing regularity." Id. at 470. Of course, it
is precisely these kinds of presumptions and stereotypes about the inherently limiting effect of
certain mental and physical conditions that antidiscrimination law was intended to eliminate.
103. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1997),
vacated, 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999) (holding that representations of disability in application for social
security disability creates rebuttable presumption that the claimant judicially estopped from es-
tablishing disability under ADA); Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-82 (9th Cir.
1996) (concluding that plaintiff who claimed total disability in applying for state benefits failed to
raise issue of material fact as to whether disabled under ADA); McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc.,
91 F.3d 610, 617-18 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997) (finding that HIV infected
plaintiff who certified to SSA that he was "totally and permanently disabled" and "unable to
work" was judicially estopped from claiming that otherwise qualified under the ADA). But see
Rascon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that
declarations and determinations of disability under social security law are relevant to, but do not
estop, claims of disability under the ADA); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 382
(6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2018 (1999) (holding that an individual's application for
and receipt of Social Security disability benefits does not bear on eligibility for ADA protec-
tions); Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding that awards of disability benefits cannot bar ADA relief).
104. See, e.g., Bollenbacher v. Helena Chemical Co., 934 F. Supp. 1015, 1027 (N.D. Ind.
1996) (holding that plaintiff, who represented himself as totally disabled for the purpose of re-
ceiving insurance benefits, was estopped from claiming disability under the ADA); Lewis v.
Zilog, 908 F. Supp. 931, 945 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that plaintiff was estopped from claiming
disability under ADA in part on the basis of his application for long-term disability benefits);
Harden v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 493, 496 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (finding the plaintiff's ar-
gument that she can perform essential functions of position "disingenuous given plaintiff's asser-
tions of total disability" in connection with application for disability benefits); Reigel v. Kaiser
Found. Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 967-70 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's and doc-
tors' statements of inability to work in connection with claim for disability benefits precluded
claim under the ADA).
105. To be "disabled" under the Social Security Act, a claimant must establish the "inability
to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be ex-
pected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)
(1994). Additionally, the impairment must be "of such severity that [he or she] is not only unable
to do [his or her] previous work, but cannot, considering ... age, education, and work experi-
ence, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy."
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
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of disability as acontextual and universal."
A notable exception to these decisions is the Supreme Court's recent
ruling in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.,'°7 which rejected
an essentialist approach and held that a claim or a determination of dis-
ability under social security law does not automatically mean that a plain-
tiff is not disabled under the ADA.' Writing for a unanimous court, Jus-
tice Breyer recognized that declarations and determinations of disability
are neither absolute nor universal, but rather legal artifacts that must be
understood within the specific context from which they derive meaning
and significance."
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's ruling in Cleveland, the over-
whelming majority of judicial decisions interpreting the meaning of dis-
ability in antidiscrimination law remain firmly rooted in essentialist bio-
medical assumptions. As a result, people with temporary and treatable
conditions, and people regarded as having anything less than a crippling
impairment, have been denied protection against discrimination. The
next section will explore the normative functions served by the construc-
tion of a category of disability that excludes so many of the ill and im-
106. Judicial faith in an absolute universal truth about disability that can be discovered by
medicine and law led the court in Harris v. Marathon Oil Co., 948 F. Supp. 27 (W.D. Tex. 1996),
to declare:
It is impossible for [the plaintiff] to have been totally disabled under social security law
and able to perform the essential functions of his position under the ADA. To allow
[plaintiff] to assert that he was able to perform the duties of his employment with
[defendant] at the same time as he collected disability benefits, awarded as a result of
his representations that he could no longer work, would countenance a fraud, either on
this court or on the federal agency that awarded him those benefits.
Id. at 29 (emphasis added). As several commentators have noted, the definition of disability in
the Social Security Act is indifferent to the impact of an on-the-job accommodation. Therefore,
it is conceivable that a person could qualify for social security benefits and be able to perform
the essential functions of a job under the ADA if accommodated. Additionally, an individual's
medical condition may have improved after he or she qualified for social security benefits. See
Burgdorf, supra note 9, at 504 (noting that decisions holding that persons who have claimed dis-
ability under the SSA are not disabled under the ADA ignore the ADA's requirement of a rea-
sonable accommodation); Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between
the Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1003, 1032-42 (1998) (explaining that decisions excluding persons deemed disabled under the
SSA from definition of disability under the ADA fail to recognize the different meanings of
these concepts within two statutory schemes); Frank S. Ravitch, Balancing Fundamental Disabil-
ity Policies: The Relationship Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Social Security
Disability, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 240, 246 (1994) (providing concrete examples of
differences between the ADA, the SSDI Program, and the SSI Program).
107. 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999).
108. See id. at 1603 (holding that pursuit or receipt of social security disability benefits does
not estop or create a presumption that the plaintiff is not disabled under ADA, but the plaintiff
must explain why these assertions are consistent with a claim of disability under ADA to survive
summary judgment).
109. See id. at 1601 ("An SSA representation of total disability differs from a purely factual
statement in that it often implies a context-related legal conclusion, namely, 'I am disabled for
the purposes of the Social Security Act."').
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paired from its bounds.
III. THE MORAL FUNCTION OF THE CATEGORY OF DISABILITY IN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
Categorical distinctions between those who do and those who do not
deserve rights and benefits conferred by law uphold values and norms
central to the existing social and economic order. In the case of public as-
sistance, for example, Joel Handler and Yeheskel Hasenfeld argue that
the eligibility criteria are "fundamentally a set of symbols that try to dif-
ferentiate between the deserving and undeserving poor in order to up-
hold ... dominant values ... through the symbols it conveys about what
behaviors are deemed virtuous or deviant.""'1 Similarly, Deborah Stone
asserts that the definition of disability in social security law "determines
what is expected of the nondisabled-what injuries, diseases, incapacities,
and problems they will be expected to tolerate in their normal working
lives.' , '
In antidiscrimination law, the types of impairments included in and
excluded from the category of disability likewise reveal the values and
normative assumptions that underlie and are reinforced by this body of
law."2 The normative function of the category of disability is to reinforce
individualism, perpetuate the "disabled overcomer" as a cultural icon,
and enforce the obligation of most disabled individuals to adapt them-
selves to the existing social and physical environment.
These norms underlie restrictive judicial interpretations of the re-
quirement that an impairment substantially limit a major life activity."3
110. JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF
POVERTY 11 (1991).
111. STONE, supra note 13, at 4.
112. See Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental
Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833, 835-36
(1976) (examining the boundaries of the category of disability in social security law as a means of
discovering underlying moral values).
113. See, e.g., Johnson v. American Chamber of Commerce Publishers, 108 F.3d 818, 820
(7th Cir. 1997) (stating that the "major life activities hurdle ... screens out trivial claims" under
the ADA). The requirement that an impairment substantially limit a major life activity has been
read into all prongs of the ADA's definition of disability. Thus, a person claiming disability on
the basis of a record of impairment, that is, a documented history of a mental or physical illness,
must establish that the condition, when manifest, substantially limited a major life activity. See
Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1998); see also 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(k) (stating that "a
record of such impairment means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental
or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities."). Given this
requirement, if a condition did not produce symptoms or otherwise significantly restrict the per-
son's functions, the information contained in a medical record may form the basis for unfavor-
able treatment by an employer without running afoul of the ADA. Additionally, as previously
stated, the requirement of a substantial limitation on a major life activity has also been read into
the "regarded as" prong of the definition. See supra Subsection II.B.1. For an argument that a
condition need not limit a major life activity to be disabling, see Burgdorf, supra note 49, at 448.
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For example, courts have set an extraordinarily high threshold for deter-
mining that a condition is "substantially" limiting-higher, in fact, than
that which has been empirically determined to significantly limit an indi-
vidual's employment opportunities."' Essentially, plaintiffs are not dis-
abled under antidiscrimination law unless a mental or physical impair-
ment is nearly totally incapacitating."5 For instance, the Supreme Court
recently reversed a decision holding that monocular vision substantially
limits the ability to see."6 Similarly, according to the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals, an orthopedic condition does not substantially limit the abil-
ity to walk unless it necessitates the use of a cane or crutches."7 Neither is
a learning disability substantially limiting unless it causes the plaintiff to
learn more slowly than 90% of the population."8 And non-Hodgkin's
lymphoma was deemed not substantially limiting, because it did not re-
strict the plaintiff's ability to "walk, see, hear, speak, breathe and work
without impairment until the late stages of the disease."" 9
Additionally, courts have equated the phrase "major life activity"'' °
with "activities of daily living," a concept from social security law that fo-
cuses on an impairment's effect on the most elementary functions of the
114. A recent federal study found that individuals with non-severe functional or activity
limitations were considerably more likely to be unemployed than workers without these limita-
tions. See U.S. NAT'L INST. ON DISABILITY AND REHABILITATION RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF
EDUC., CHARTBOOK ON WORK AND DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 10, 14 (1998) (finding
that 32.2% of people with any functional limitation are employed though 82.1% of people with
no functional limitation are employed, and finding a 51.8% rate of labor force participation
among people with some activity limitation compared to a 83% rate of labor force participation
among individuals with no activity limitation).
115. See, e.g., Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding
that panic attacks that hampered plaintiff's ability to speak and breathe were not substantially
limiting because the disorder did not usually impede these activities); Baxter v. Northwest Air-
lines, Inc., No. 96 C 2060, 1998 WL 603121 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1998) (finding that back injury that
prevented plaintiff from lifting more than 10 pounds frequently and more than 20 pounds infre-
quently was not substantially limiting); Johnson v. New York Med. College, No. 95 CIV. 8413,
1997 WL 580708 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1997) (holding that colitis that caused cramping, rectal
bleeding, lower back pain, nausea, explosive diarrhea, and mental depression, necessitating a
month and a half of in-patient treatment, was not substantially limiting because conditions did
not result in repeated hospitalizations or absences from work for extended periods of time).
116. See Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999); see also Still v. Freeport-
McMoran, Inc., 120 F.3d 50, 52 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff who was blind in one eye
was not substantially limited in ability to see).
117. See Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that a plaintiff who
had "great difficulty walking" had not proven disability because he did not require any "special
devices" to walk, such as a cane or crutches).
118. See Price v. National Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 966 F. Supp. 419, 427 (S.D. W. Va. 1997)
(suggesting that a learning impairment is disabling if it causes a person to learn as slowly as the
bottom 10% of population).
119. Hirsch v. National Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977, 981-82 (N.D. I11. 1997).
120. Neither the FRA nor ADA defines the term "major life activity." Regulations under
the ADA define "major life activities" as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing man-
ual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(i) (1998).
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human body. 2' This reductionism has resulted in decisions holding that
relatively infrequent or complex human activities, such as sex,22 repro-
duction, 23 social interaction,"' and awareness,' are not major life activi-
ties. As a consequence, courts have determined that plaintiffs with condi-
tions such as infertility, asymptomatic infection with HIV (and other
conditions that limit sex and reproduction),' 26 and epilepsy 127 are not dis-
abled.
121. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2143 (1999) (suggesting that Con-
gress intended disability under the ADA to be determined by a functional approach, which ex-
amines the effect of impairment upon usual activities, rather than a health conditions approach,
which looks at whether an individual has a condition that impairs his or her health); see also
Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1995) (determining that the plaintiff
failed to establish a substantial limitation on major life activities because she could "take care of
the normal activities of daily living," such as feeding herself, grooming, picking-up trash, and
vacuuming); Terrell v. USAIR, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 1448,1453 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (finding that carpal
tunnel syndrome did not substantially limit a major life activity because the plaintiff retained the
ability to care for herself); Kriskovic v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1355, 1362 (E.D. Wis.
1996) (holding that to be "major," an activity must be among those "that are a necessary part of
the everyday lives of most people or are otherwise 'basic functions'); Hatfield v. Quantum
Chem. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (finding that the plaintiff hospitalized on
several occasions for severe major depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and borderline
personality disorder was not disabled because he retained the ability to care for himself and his
family, groom, drive a car, have lunch at a restaurant, cook, and work in his yard). For a pro-
vocative analysis of the normative assumptions and gender bias underlying impairment-based
methods of determining disability, see Ellen Pryor Smith, Flawed Promises: A Critical Evaluation
of the American Medical Association's Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 103
HARV. L. REV. 964 (1990).
122. See Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 170-71 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating
that intimate sexual relations may not constitute a major life activity); Johnson v. New York
Med. College, No. 95 Civ. 8413, 1997 WL 580708, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1997) (implying that
sex is not a major life activity).
123. In Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2205 (1998), the Supreme Court held that repro-
duction is a major life activity. Prior to this decision, a number of courts had reached the oppo-
site conclusion. See, e.g., Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 170-71 (4th Cir. 1997)
(stating that the court is not convinced that reproduction is a major life activity); Krauel v. Iowa
Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that it would be inconsistent with
regulations to treat reproduction as a major life activity, and a "considerable stretch of federal
law"); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995) (stating that it
could not "reasonably infer" that reproduction is a major life activity).
124. See Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997) (expressing doubt
about whether getting along with others is a major life activity).
125. See Deas v. River W., 152 F.3d 471, 479 (5th Cir. 1998) (declining to recognize that
awareness is a major life activity); Innes v. Mechatronics, Inc., No. 96-35515, 1997 WL 409585, at
*2 (9th Cir. July 14, 1997) (recognizing that staying awake and alert are major life activities only
in relation to individual's ability to work).
126. In Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2196, the Supreme Court held that asymptomatic HIV infec-
tion was a disability under the ADA because it limited the plaintiff's ability to reproduce. Prior
to this decision, a number of courts had reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Krauel, 95
F.3d at 674 (holding that asymptomatic HIV infection is not a disability); Cortes v. McDonald's
Corp., 955 F. Supp. 541, 546 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (holding that asymptomatic HIV infection is not a
disability); Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243 (holding that a reproductive disorder is not a disability);
Runnebaum, 123 F.3d 156 at 170-71 (holding that a reproductive disorder is not a disability).
127. See Deas v. River West, 152 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that epilepsy is not a
disability).
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 18:1,1999
The "one job is not enough" rule,'28 which is applied to cases in which
the plaintiff claims a substantial limitation on the ability to work, '29 has
excluded the largest group of employees experiencing adverse conse-
quences of a mental or physical impairment from the category of disabil-
ity. Typically in these cases, the plaintiff has a physical or mental condi-
tion that restricts the performance of a job held prior to the condition's
onset.'3 ° After recuperating and returning to work, the plaintiff is dis-
charged or denied an accommodation.' These cases constitute the most
common type of discrimination challenged under the ADA.'32
As previously explained,'33 the "one job is not enough rule," which has
recently been sanctioned by the Supreme Court,' imposes nearly insur-
128. For a critical, in-depth analysis of the "one job is not enough" rule, see Bales, supra
note 86, at 242 ("A person should be recognized as substantially limited in the major life activity
of working if that person is excluded from even one job because she is-or is regarded as-
disabled."); Burgdorf, supra note 9, at 439-55, 573-74.
129. EEOC regulations specify that work is a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
§ 1630.2(i) (1998).
130. See, e.g., Coleman v. Keebler Co., 997 F. Supp. 1102, 1108 (N.D. Ind. 1998)
(adjudicating plaintiff's discrimination claim based on employer's refusal to offer transfer after
employee was absent from work to recover from surgery to alleviate arthritis); Piper v. Kim-
berly-Clark Corp., 970 F. Supp. 566, 568-69 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (adjudicating plaintiff's ADA claim
due to being terminated several weeks after returning to work after recovering from on job-
related back injury); Gomez v. American Bldg. Maintenance, 940 F. Supp. 255, 256 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (considering discrimination claim of janitor, who sustained back injury that prevented him
from returning to his position, based on employer's refusal to provide employee training as jani-
torial foreman); Leslie v. St. Vincent New Hope, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 879, 880 (S.D. Ind. 1996)
(considering discrimination claim of health care attendant, who suffered back injury on the job,
based on employer's failure to reassign employee to lighter duty or to transfer her after she re-
turned to work); Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1099 (S.D. Ga. 1995)
(adjudicating claim of plaintiff, who sustained occupational injury that necessitated two-year ab-
sence from work, due to employer's refusal to offer employee accommodation upon his return);
Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 783, 785-86 (W.D. Okla. 1993) (adjudicating discrimination
claim of plaintiff, who sustained work-related injury to his feet, based on employer's refusal to
permit him to return to former or any other position).
131. In such a circumstance, workers might have a claim under the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 if they were discharged or otherwise discriminated against for exercising a
right protected under this statute, which requires that employers offer employees a 12-week un-
paid leave of absence due to a serious medical condition. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2615(a)(1)
(1994).
132. Nearly three quarters of all disability discrimination claims under the ADA involve
discharge or the failure to provide reasonable accommodations. See Peter Blanck & Mollie
Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 VILL. L. REv. 345, 369 (1997) (finding that 50% of all EEOC charges involve discharge, 28%
involve failure to provide accommodation, 10% involve hiring, and 12% involve disability-
related harassment).
133. For a discussion of the "one job is not enough rule" within the context of the "regarded
as" prong of the definition of disability, see supra notes 61 et seq. and accompanying text.
134. See Murphy v. UPS, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999) (affirming decision that mechanic's ability to
work was not substantially limited because he retained the capacity to perform mechanic jobs
that did not require driving a commercial vehicle); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct.
2139 (1999) (affirming dismissal of claim on ground that petitioners were not substantially lim-
ited in their ability to work because, while they were unable to perform job of global pilot, they
could function as regional pilots or pilot instructors).
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mountable burdens. Under this rule, plaintiffs who claim that an impair-
ment substantially limits their ability to work must demonstrate more
than an inability to perform their job.'35 Instead, they must demonstrate
an inability to perform an entire class or category of jobs, despite their
training and experience in a specific type of employment and their self-
identification as a specific type of worker or professional.'36 Thus, for ex-
ample, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that carpal tunnel syn-
drome was not a disability because, while it prevented the plaintiff (an
assembly line worker) from performing medium- and heavy-duty factory
labor, it did not disqualify her from light-duty manufacturing jobs.'37
Some courts have gone even further, requiring that plaintiffs prove that
their impairment prevents them from performing virtually any type of
work.'38 As one court stated, a condition does not substantially limit the
ability to work unless it "place[s] the individual so far outside the norm as
to make it impossible or unusually difficult ... to perform work that
could be done by most other people."'3 9
135. See Patrick v. Southern Co. Servs., 910 F. Supp. 566, 570-71 (N.D. Ala. 1996)
(."[W]orking' does not mean working at the particular job of that person's choice.") (quoting
Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385-86 (8th Cir. 1995)). It is interesting to note that in
the Netherlands, disabled workers need only establish that they cannot perform their customary
job to qualify for financial assistance from the government. See LEO J.M. AARTS & PHILIP R.M.
DE JONG, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF DISABILITY BEHAVIOR, 27-39, 354 (1992).
136. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2152 (1999) (affirming the
dismissal of a claim on the ground that the petitioners were not substantially limited in their
ability to work because, while they were unable to perform the job of a global pilot, they could
function as regional pilots or pilot instructors); Murphy v. UPS, 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2138-39 (1999)
(affirming decision that a mechanic's ability to work was not substantially limited because he
retained the capacity to perform mechanic jobs that did not require driving a commercial vehi-
cle); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1995) (asserting that the inability
to perform one aspect of a job while retaining the ability to perform the work in general does notamount to substantial limitation of ability to work); Maulding v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 694, 698 (8th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the plaintiff, whose allergy only prevented her from performing lab
work, was not disabled under FRA); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1250
(6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the plaintiff, who had crossed eyes that prevented him only from
performing the job of mail sorter, was not disabled under FRA); Shah v. Upjohn Co., 922 F.
Supp. 15, 25 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (dismissing a claim by a lab technician with fourteen years of
experience because she failed to demonstrate that she could not perform non-laboratory work);
Patrick v. Southern Co. Servs., 910 F. Supp. 566, 570 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff,
who suffered from an allergy did not establish that the condition prevented her from working in
a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes).
137. See McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 372-73 (6th Cir. 1996). The EEOC
argued as amicus curiae that the plaintiff was disabled because her condition prevented her from
performing any manual labor exceeding light duty. See id. at 372.
138. See Hileman v. City of Dallas, 115 F.3d 352, 354-55 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that the
plaintiff claiming a substantial limitation of the ability to work bears the burden of proving that
she could not find any job); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc, 836 F. Supp. 783, 788 (W.D. Okla. 1993)
(stating that plaintiff must establish that the condition restricts his "overall employment oppor-
tunities" to establish substantial limitation of the ability to work).
139. Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1418 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Cook v. R.I. Dep't
of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosps., 783 F. Supp. 1569, 1574 (D.R.I. 1992)); see also Locke,
supra note 9, at 122 ("Unless the plaintiff can prove that his unemployability significantly ex-
ceeds his employability, courts will find that the plaintiff is not sufficiently limited in his em-
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In short, to meet the burden of the "one job is not enough" rule,
plaintiffs must prove something close-but not equal to-total disabil-
ity. ' Either they must demonstrate that they applied for and did not ob-
tain a considerable number of comparable jobs or they must submit the
testimony of vocational experts."' In one of the relatively few of these
cases to survive summary dismissal, the court held that the testimony of
the defendant's vocational expert-that the plaintiff was unable to per-
form 90% of all jobs within the nation's economy-was sufficient to raise
a material issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was disabled under the
ADA.
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The "one job is not enough rule," along with the other restrictive in-
terpretations of the definition of disability discussed above, creates a false
dichotomy among individuals with mental and physical conditions by
separating them into two groups: the deserving disabled and the merely
ill.' 3 Those who are defined as "disabled" merit legal protection from dis-
ployment opportunities to be considered disabled.").
140. Plaintiffs alleging that a condition substantially limits their ability to work must run a
gauntlet to establish a prima facie case under the ADA. On the one hand, evidence that a condi-
tion is substantially limiting may be used to refute a plaintiff's claim that he or she can perform
the essential functions of a job, which is another element of a prima facie case. See, e.g., Hatfield
v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D. Tex. 1996) ("It is logically inconsistent for
Hatfield to say he is so impaired that he cannot care for himself, while at the same time saying
that he can go to work and perform his job."). On the other hand, evidence of an ability to per-
form the essential functions of a job may be used to refute a plaintiff's claim of disability. See,
e.g., Murphy v. UPS, 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2138-39 (1999) (stating that the plaintiff's proof that he
could perform various jobs as a mechanic undermined his claim that he was disabled).
141. See, e.g., Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992) (showing that the
plaintiff failed to produce the testimony of a vocational expert to demonstrate the substantial
limitation of his ability to work); Piper v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 970 F. Supp. 566, 572 (E.D. Tex.
1997) (demonstrating that testimony by a rehabilitation expert showing that job opportunities
for the plaintiff were not prevalent was not sufficiently detailed to defeat a motion for summary
judgment); Lamury v. Boeing Co., 5 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 39, 44 (D. Kan. 1995)
(dismissing the claim because the plaintiff failed to produce demographic and vocational evi-
dence); Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (D. Md. 1988) (suggesting that the proof that the
plaintiff's condition substantially limited his ability to work was not necessarily established by his
rejection from over 300 jobs). But see Leslie v. St. Vincent New Hope, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 879, 885
(S.D. Ind. 1996) (rejecting the requirement that the plaintiff produce job market data to establish
a substantial limitation on his ability to work).
142. See Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1101 (S.D. Ga. 1995). In light of the
fact that the plaintiff's nearly total disability was established by the defendant's vocational ex-
pert, it is remarkable that the court did not find the plaintiff disabled as a matter of law. See also
Jasmantas v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 139 F.3d 1155, 1157 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the defendant's expert's testimony that the plaintiff's impairment prevented her from performing
88% of the jobs in the county was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on whether she was
disabled under ADA).
143. The rhetoric of the deserving and undeserving disabled was explicitly employed during
congressional debate on the ADA. For example, Rep. Dan Burton argued that individuals with
AIDS, hepatitis, and serious psychiatric conditions were undeserving of the status of "disability."
See 135 CONG. REc. 22731 (1989) (statement of Rep. Burton). Professor Robert Burgdorf, who
participated in drafting the ADA, asserts that the predominant view within the Reagan and Bush
administrations and the EEOC at the time of the statute's enactment was that disability dis-
crimination law was a "special service" that only the severely disabled deserved. See Burgdorf,
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criminatory treatment, segregation, or exclusion.'" Additionally, the re-
quirement of reasonable accommodation exempts "disabled" individuals
from the prevailing expectation that it is the obligation of individuals to
conform to the existing demands of the physical environment. For the de-
serving disabled, the reverse is required-the physical and social envi-
ronment must be changed in response to their needs.' 5
In contrast, the merely ill are officially deemed unworthy of these so-
cial interventions and legal protections. As a result, they may be singled
out for unfavorable treatment solely because others find their physical or
mental condition frightening, embarrassing, or otherwise offensive. As
Judge Richard Posner has noted approvingly, antidiscrimination law "is
not a general protection of medically afflicted persons .... If the em-
ployer discriminates against [individuals] on account of their being... ill,
even permanently ill, but not disabled, there is no violation."'46
Neither are the merely ill worthy of accommodation. Instead, it is up
to them to do whatever is necessary to function in a world designed to
meet the needs of the healthy and able-bodied. Those who fail to acquire
the status of "disabled" under antidiscrimination law are thus judged ca-
pable of bearing the burden of their impairment or illness on their own.
By assigning the protected status of deserving disabled to so few indi-
viduals with mental and physical conditions and the unprotected status of
merely ill to so many, the restrictive category of disability in antidiscrimi-
nation law reinforces the cult of the individual in American society and
affirms self-reliance as the ultimate American virtue. Within the moral
framework of antidiscrimination law, the only impaired individuals who
deserve society's sympathy and assistance are those who strive for auton-
omy and self-support despite the most severe physical and mental condi-
tions. In drawing its boundaries so narrowly, the category of disability
thus affirms the obligation of all but the most impaired to rise above their
limitations, to meet the challenges of the physical and social world, and to
manage the consequences of their condition unaided. The inability of
these individuals to overcome their impairments is a sign of moral failure
supra note 9, at 568.
144. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12132, 12183 (1994) (defining "discrimination" as used in
ADA titles I, II, and III, respectively).
145. Required accommodations under the ADA include physically accessible facilities, re-
structured jobs, modified work schedules, revised eligibility criteria, and specially adapted
equipment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9), 12112(a)-(b); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(a) (stating that
discrimination includes failing to reasonably accommodate disabled individuals).
146. Christian v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 118 S. Ct. 1304 (1998); see also Benedict v. Eau Claire Pub. Schs., No. 97-2513, 1998 WL
60374, at *7 (7th Cir. Feb. 10, 1998) ("Where the employer discriminates against an individual
who is ill, who is mistakenly thought to be ill, or who may even be permanently ill but is not dis-
abled, there is no violation of the Act.").
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on their part, not society's.
The "one job is not enough rule," in particular, enforces the expecta-
tion that, absent a crippling condition, workers must bear the employ-
ment consequences of their illness or impairment privately, without any
assistance from their employers. This expectation obtains regardless of
the employee's length of service and even when the impairment results
directly from of the employee's effort to serve the employer's interests by
doing his or her job. For example, in Hatfield v. Quantum Chemical Cor-
poration,"'7 a male plant worker was sexually harassed by a male supervi-
sor who frequently called him "pussy" and repeatedly requested oral
sex.' 8 On one occasion, the supervisor pulled the plaintiff's head in the
direction of his groin. As a result of this treatment, the plaintiff devel-
oped psychiatric symptoms and was hospitalized several times. Upon re-
turning to work, the employer denied the plaintiff's request to be reas-
signed to another supervisor. In summarily dismissing the claim, the court
found that, while the plaintiff's psychiatric condition substantially limited
his ability to work for the defendant, it did not substantially limit his abil-
ity to do other work under other supervisors, who presumably would not
harass him sexually.'4 9
Similarly, in Gomez v. American Building Maintenance,5 ' a janitor
who had worked for the defendant for 15 years suffered an on-the-job
back injury that permanently prevented him from doing janitorial work.
The plaintiff filed an action under the ADA after the defendant denied
his request for accommodation-either retraining as a janitorial foreman
or reassignment to lighter duty. Seizing on the plaintiff's request for these
positions, as well as on medical evidence demonstrating that he was able
to perform the less strenuous tasks they involved, the court summarily
dismissed the claim because "the evidence shows that while the plaintiff
is unable to perform the job duties of a janitor ... he is able to work."'5'
The message of these cases is clear: workers who suffer an occupational
illness or injury and lose their job as a result must simply re-enter the la-
bor market and absorb the adverse social and economic consequences,
including those associated with discrimination, without legal protection. 2
147. 920 F. Supp. 108 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
148. See id. at 109. The court dismissively referred to the cause of the plaintiff's disability as
his "interaction" with his supervisor. See id. at 110.
149. See id.
150. 940 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
151. Id. at 259.
152. The category of disability in antidiscrimination law facilitates the existence of a"reserve army" of the unemployed, comprised of workers who are terminated or denied accom-
modation after recovering from an injury or illness. Lacking a right to reemployment or to ac-
commodation under antidiscrimination law, and unable to perform the job in which they have
training and experience, workers who sustain occupational injuries or suffer an illness are forced
Vol. 18:1, 1999
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Consistent with its roots in individualism, the restrictive category of
disability in antidiscrimination law reinforces the exalted status of the
"overcomer" in American culture-the individual who, through sheer de-
termination, triumphs over daunting obstacles to achieve self-sufficiency
and fulfill the social obligation to work. Indeed, by including within its
ambit only those individuals with the most severe impairments, this nar-
row category creates inspirational role models-paragons of personal
autonomy who serve as reminders that any and all impediments to work
and self-sufficiency can and must be overcome, even (and perhaps espe-
cially) in this era of dwindling social services. During congressional de-
bate on the ADA, stories of overcomers were periodically invoked to
convince skeptical legislators that people with disabilities are consum-
mate Americans-hard-working, self-sacrificing, invincible-and there-
fore deserving of legal protection against discrimination. 3 It is perhaps
this affirmation of the ethic of self-reliance and individual autonomy that
accounts for the widespread support for the ADA among Republican
legislators, many of whom simultaneously opposed social welfare legisla-
tion benefiting the disabled'54 and civil rights laws protecting other margi-
nalized groups.'55
back into the labor market where they are unlikely to command comparable status or wages. If
the injury or illness necessitated an extended period of unemployment, these workers may be
under great pressure to accept a lower paying or entry level position.
153. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S10,803 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (describing story of Mark
Wellman, who overcame paraplegia to climb Mt. Capitan).
154. The 101st Congress did not enact the following social welfare measures to aid people
with disabilities: H.R. 5774, 101st Cong. (1990) (amending the Internal Revenue Code allowing
disabled taxpayers a one-time exclusion on gain from sale of residence); Social Security Benefits
Improvement Act of 1990, H.R. 5142, 101st Cong. (1990) (amending the Social Security Act to
increase earnings permitted to disabled beneficiaries without loss of eligibility for benefits); H.R.
5105, 101st Cong. (1990) (amending the Social Security Act to provide benefits for disabled wid-
ows and widowers without regard to age); H.R. 4517, 101st Cong. (1990) (amending the Social
Security Act to afford all disabled individuals the same SSI income exclusions that are available
to blind persons); H.R. 4154, 101st Cong. (1990) (amending the Social Security Act to reduce the
waiting period for Medicare eligibility for disabled individuals); Home Repairs for Older and
Disabled Homeowners Act of 1990, H.R. 3928, 101st Cong. (1990) (authorizing grants to dis-
abled individuals to repair and modify their homes); Veterans Compensation Cost-of-Living
Adjustment Act of 1990, S. 2100, 101st Cong. (1990) (increasing rates of compensation and en-
hancing health care, education, and housing benefits for veterans with sevice-connected disabili-
ties).
155. The 101st Congress did not enact the following civil rights legislation: Employee Pro-
tection Act of 1990, H.R. 4420, 101st Cong. (1990) (prohibiting employers from discriminating
against employees who refuse to submit to sterilization or fertility test); Civil Rights Amendment
Act of 1989, H.R. 655, 101st Cong. (1989) (amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair
Housing Act to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and affectional preference);
Equality in Education Act of 1987, H.R. 495, 101st Cong. (1989) (amending the Internal Reve-
nue Code denying tax exempt status to educational institutions that discriminate on basis of
race); Diversification in Broadcast Ownership Act of 1989, H.R. 248, 101st Cong. (1989)
(amending the Broadcast Ownership Act of 1989 to provide incentives to increase the number of
women- and minority-owned broadcast stations); Broadcasting Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1989, H.R. 247, 101st Cong. (1989) (amending the Communications Act of 1934 to require
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The elevated moral status of the overcomer is also reflected in and
reinforced by antidiscrimination law's method for determining disability.
Neither the Federal Rehabilitation Act nor the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act expressly specifies any impairments that are "per se" disabling.
Consequently, the Supreme Court 56 and the EEOC '57 have taken the po-
sition that there are no "per se" disabilities under either statute. As a re-
sult, every claim of disability under antidiscrimination law is adjudicated
on a case-by-case basis.1 8 Thus, in order to secure a remedy for unequal
treatment, all plaintiffs claiming discrimination must begin by establish-
ing that they have, or were perceived to have, a mental or physical im-
pairment that substantially limits a major life activity 59 This individual-
ized method of determining disability under antidiscrimination law is in
marked contrast to social security law, which recognizes that some mental
and physical conditions are unquestionably incapacitating.160
In determining disability on an individualized basis and rejecting the
premise that particular physical or mental conditions are necessarily in-
capacitating, antidiscrimination law reflects and reinforces the deeply
held American value of personal sovereignty, and the concomitant belief
radio and television broadcasters to adopt affirmative action programs); NonDiscrimination in
Advertising Act of 1989, H.R. 138, 101st Cong. (1989) (amending the Internal Revenue Code to
penalize persons who discriminate against minority-owned communications entities).
156. See Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (1999) (holding that the lan-
guage of the ADA, by defining disability with "respect to an individual," 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
(1994), and in terms of the impact of an impairment on "such individual," 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A), mandates individualized disability determinations in all cases); see also Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc. 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2147 (1999) ("Whether a person has a disability under the
ADA is an individualized inquiry.").
157. See Interpretive Guidance to Title I of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j)
(1998) (stating that "[t]he determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity must be made on a case-by-case basis").
158. See, e.g., Deas v. River West, 152 F.3d 471, 479 (5th Cir. 1998) (declining to recognize
any per se disabilities under ADA); Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55,
60 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that plain language of ADA does not permit the conclusion that HIV
infection is per se a disability); Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 565 (7th Cir. 1992)
(determining disability under FRA should be on a case-by-case basis); McKey v. Occidental
Chem. Corp., 956 F. Supp. 1313, 1317 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that the ADA does not recog-
nize any per se disabilities); Merry v. A. Sulka & Co., 953 F. Supp. 922, 925 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(holding that there are no per se disabilities under ADA). But see Anderson v. Gus Mayer Bos-
ton Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 777 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (finding that HIV infection and AIDS are per
se disabilities).
159. See, e.g., Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2169 (holding that all those who claim the Act's pro-
tection must "prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of
their own experience.., is substantial").
160. Claimants for social security disability benefits are judged disabled per se if they have a
condition that "meets or equals" an impairment specified on a lengthy list provided by the Social
Security Administration. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526 (1998). Approximately
60% of recipients of social security disability benefits have a listed impairment. See Cleveland v.
Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1603 (1999). From a normative standpoint,
Lance Liebman asserts that social security law's per se approach to determining disability
"incorporates common expectations and shared values about which infirmities a person ought
not to have to bear and keep working." Liebman, supra note 112, at 853 (emphasis omitted).
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that any type of personal misfortune, even the most crippling congenital
impairment, can and must be overcome by individual will.' The faith of
antidiscrimination law in the hegemony of the individual is also revealed
in its recognition that, while no impairments are per se disabling, there
are per se nondisabilities, which presumably can be overcome by all.' 62
Consistent with this philosophy, disability discrimination law is pro-
foundly suspicious of any plaintiff who professes to be limited by a physi-
cal or mental impairment.16 The requirement that each and every plain-
tiff prove disability within the context of an adversarial process by a
preponderance of the evidence to the satisfaction of a judge is aimed at
ferreting out malingerers. Within this structure, federal judges are the
system's gatekeepers, ever watchful for claimants who falsely claim dis-
ability and renounce self-reliance in order to secure less demanding
working conditions through the statute's reasonable accommodation re-
quirement.
Judicial disdain for individuals perceived to have needlessly aban-
doned their personal sovereignty to illness or impairment will occasion-
ally bubble to the surface of disability discrimination jurisprudence. For
example, in Hileman v. City of Dallas,1 64 the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals invoked the denigrating imagery of the welfare system to express its
antipathy toward the plaintiff, who was viewed as having opted for the
benefits of antidiscrimination law instead of striving to overcome his im-
pairments on his own. 165 The court stated, "We refuse to construe the Re-
habilitation Act as a handout to those who are in fact capable of working
161. See IRVING K. ZOLA, MISSING PIECES, 200 (1982). Zola states:
The United States is a nation built on the premise that there is no mountain that cannot
be leveled, no river that cannot be tamed, no force of nature that cannot be harnessed.
It should be no great surprise that we similarly claim that there is no disease that cannot
be cured.
Id.
162. See Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that obesity is
not disabling); Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156, 169 (4th Cir. 1997)
(holding that asymptomatic HIV infection "will never qualify as an impairment"); Williams v.
Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding as a matter of law
that the inability to lift 25 pounds is not disability under ADA); EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 959
F. Supp. 405, 409 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (stating that cancer is not a per se disability); Johnson v. New
York Med. College, No. 95 CIV. 8413, 1997 WL 580708, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1997) (holding
that colitis is not a substantially limiting impairment).
163. This skepticism is shared by some critics of the ADA who routinely assert-without
providing any empirical support-that many claims of disability under antidiscrimination law are
feigned. See, e.g., Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impairments Under the Americans With Dis-
abilities Act. A Search for the Meaning of 'Disability', 73 WASH. L. REV. 575, 586 (1998)
(arguing, without empirical support, that ADA's "flexible" definition of disability and"extraordinary benefits" encourage "creative employees to search for a basis to claim disability
protection").
164. 115 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 1997).
165. The plaintiff had multiple sclerosis and a spastic colon. See id. at 352.
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S,166 This characterization of disability discrimination law is echoed in
conservative critiques that explicitly liken the ADA to welfare.67
Finally, by exempting the social collective from any responsibility in
managing the consequences of illnesses and impairments that are less
than crippling, antidiscrimination law contributes to the construction of
health and illness as fundamentally private concerns.169 The case of
EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co.,7 in which an employee with leukemia
challenged his termination under the ADA, is illustrative. Even though
this plaintiff's condition required that he miss three to five days of work
each month to receive chemotherapy, the court refused to recognize his
condition as substantially limiting. Under this decision, medical needs are
private burdens that no bearing on whether or not a condition is a
"disability" whose adverse effects on an employee must be shared by so-
ciety.
IV. THE POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE CATEGORY OF DISABILITY IN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
Progressive legal scholars argue that the existence of formal rights
under antidiscrimination law both advances and hinders the attainment of
equality. 171 On the one hand, the process of securing, utilizing and pre-
166. Id. at 354 (emphasis added); see also Young v. U.S. West Communications, No. 97-
2287, 1998 WL 849523 (10th Cir. Dec. 9, 1998). Judges also frequently feel compelled to remind
plaintiffs (and those who read judicial opinions) that the ADA is not a "job insurance policy."
See, e.g., Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995); Rogers v. CH2M
Hill, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1342 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Kirkendall v. UPS, 964, F. Supp. 106, 112
(W.D.N.Y. 1997); Murphy v. UPS, 946 F. Supp. 872, 877 (D. Kan. 1996), affd 141 F.3d 1185
(10th Cir. 1999), affd 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
167. See, e.g., Walter Y. Oi, Disability and a Workfare-Welfare Dilemma, in DISABILITY &
WORK, supra note 38, at 31, 45 ("The ADA will result in an inflated population of disabled per-
sons whose welfare will become increasingly dependent upon an evergrowing federal bureauc-
racy. Charles Murray may have another opportunity to test his model." (emphasis added));
Weaver, supra note 38, at 15 (describing the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement as
a "mandated benefit program" that "amounts to an off-budget spending program"); Christopher
J. Willis, Comment, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Disabling the Disabled, 25
CUMB. L. REv. 715, 730 (1995) (describing the ADA as a tool to redistribute wealth from con-
sumers and able-bodied workers to individuals with disabilities who invoke the statute's protec-
tions).
168. In contrast, several other laws socialize some of the costs and consequences of illnesses
and impairments that impede the ability to work. These statutes include: social security laws,
which provide income to the disabled workers who cannot engage in any gainful activity; work-
ers' compensation laws, which provide income to employees who are unable to work due to an
injury or condition that is job-related; and the Family and Medical Leave Act, which requires an
unpaid leave of absence for workers who are unable to perform their job. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-
2615 (1994).
169. Additionally, the intensely private concepts of health and illness that are embedded
within disability discrimination law reinforce the legitimacy of the U.S. health care system, to
which access is a matter of private means and personal circumstance, not collective right.
170. 959 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
171. For scholarship exploring the contradictory functions of antidiscrimination law in the-
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serving legal rights focuses the emancipatory aspirations of marginalized
groups and facilitates the formation of a collective identity.' Addition-
ally, antidiscrimination laws provide an important instrument with whichto reist • 171
to resist exclusion. In cautioning against the temptation to dismiss the
salutary effect of formal legal rights on the lives of African-Americans,
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw has stated,
Although liberal legal ideology may indeed function to mystify, it remains re-
ceptive to some aspirations that are central to Black demands, and may also
perform an important function in combating the experience of being excluded
and oppressed. This receptivity to Black aspirations is crucial given the hos-
tile social world that racism creates.174
However, formal legal rights also thwart the creation of an equitable
social order. Given the general legitimizing function of the law, antidis-
crimination law in particular is unlikely to produce widespread social
change.'75 As a consequence, successful disability discrimination claims
are likely to be restricted to those that pose no significant threat to ma-
jority interests or to the existing social and political order. 76 Indeed, a re-
cent study found that employers prevailed in ninety-two percent of all
cases finally decided under Title I of the ADA.77
Moreover, the rhetoric of equal rights creates a mystique of equality
that masks continuing inequality and legitimizes expressions of the very
types of bias that the law professes to prohibit. 8 Again, Crenshaw ex-
ory and as applied to particular bodies of law, see generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL
THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 164-72 (1990) (describing andcritiquing the critical legal studies critique of antidiscrimination law); Mary Becker, The Sixties
Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 209 (1998) (analyzing the positive and negative effects of a formal equality ap-
proach to ending discrimination on the basis of gender); Crenshaw, supra note 16 (critiquing race
discrimination law); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) (critiquing antidiscrimina-
tion law as applied to discrimination on the basis of accents).
172. See Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1563, 1590 (1984) (arguing that the process of securing legal
rights can strengthen a movement's consciousness and awaken a sense of possibility).
173. See Becker, supra note 171, at 252-53 (discussing how formal equality has improved
women's lives); Crenshaw, supra note 16, at 1357 (discussing the transformative potential of race
discrimination law).
174. Crenshaw, supra note 16, at 1357.
175. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
176. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW § 9.6, at 117 (2d ed.
Supp. 1984) ("Discrimination claims, when they are dramatic enough, and do not greatly
threaten majority concerns, are given a sympathetic hearing, but there is a pervasive sense that
definite limits have been set on the weight that minority claims receive .... "); see also Gabel,
supra note 172, at 1591 (obtaining formal legal rights tempts a civil rights movement to return
power to the state in exchange for the law's recognition of a narrow set of demands).
177. See American Bar Association, Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial
and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 404 (1998).
178. See Freeman, supra note 14, at 1052 and passim (arguing that antidiscrimination law
legitimizes racial inequality as a nonviolation while assuming that society has already attained
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plains,
[Wlhat at first glance appears an unambiguous commitment to antidiscrimi-
nation conceals within it many conflicting and contradictory interests. In anti-
discrimination law, the conflicting interests actually reinforce existing social
arrangements, moderated to the extent necessary to balance the civil rights
challenge with the many interests still privileged over it.
179
Disability discrimination law similarly embodies contradictions that
both advance and counteract the elimination of inequality based on dis-
ability. For example, the process of securing formal legal rights-
especially under the ADA-did serve to focus and mobilize the emanci-
patory aspirations of people with disabilities.' 8° Additionally, there is
some evidence that the ADA has improved the lives of people with dis-
abilities even in the relatively short period since it was enacted.'
However, disability discrimination law also impedes the attainment of
equality by stigmatizing disabled plaintiffs, undermining political unity
among people with disabilities, and legitimizing many forms of disability
bias. These aspects of disability discrimination law are explored below.
A. The Stigmatization and Objectification of the Disabled
To earn the right to tell their story of unequal treatment, plaintiffs
claiming disability discrimination must first recount the story of their dif-
ference-that is, their "abnormality." To convince the state that they are
"truly" disabled, plaintiffs must engage in a dialogue that includes an in-
vestigation of precisely how their physical or mental condition restricts
their bodily functions and life activities.' 2 Within this context, plaintiffs
color-blindness).
179. Crenshaw, supra note 16, at 1348; see also Freeman, supra note 14, at 1042 and passim.
180. See SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 126 (describing unifying effect of the struggle to enact
the ADA).
181. See generally Blanck, supra note 4, at 394 (finding improvement in the lives of some
people with disabilities since the ADA's enactment). But see National Organization on Disabil-
ity, Executive Summary of 1998 National Organization on Disability/Louis Harris & Associates
Survey of Americans with Disabilities (July 23, 1998) (visited May 3, 1999)
<http://www.nod.org/presssurvey.html> (finding no improvement between 1986-1998 in gaps
between disabled and nondisabled in socializing, going to a restaurant, income, access to health
care, and satisfaction with life).
182. See Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2168-69 (1999) (stating that the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was "too quick" to find that monocular vision was a disability
because it had not inquired into precise ways in which condition limited petitioner's ability to
see); Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 168 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir.
1999) (reversing denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the
lower court had failed to engage in sufficiently detailed inquiry into nature of plaintiff's impair-
ment and precisely how it limited major life activity). The only ADA plaintiffs who may be ex-
cused from the requirement of proving disability are those who claim discrimination on the basis
of a preemployment inquiry. See Griffin v. Steeltek Inc., 160 F.3d 591, 595 (10th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1455 (1999) (holding that a non-disabled individual may bring a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2), which prohibits inquiries about whether a job applicant is dis-
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must do more than prove that they have a recognized medical diagnosis,
which itself often contains a functional component. 183 Instead, they are in-
terrogated regarding their physical or mental differences, and a judgment
is made as to whether those differences prevent them from leading a
"normal" life.8 Claims of disability under antidiscrimination law are
most likely to be recognized if they are corroborated by experts and sta-
tistics.'85
All plaintiffs-even those whose impairments are life-threatening 1 or
obviously disablinglS_-must endure this inquiry, which often requires the
disclosure of detailed, intimate, and embarrassing information. For ex-
ample, to earn the right to be protected against discrimination because
she was infected with HIV, Sidney Abbott was required to convince the
court that the infection substantially limited her sex life and her plans to
have children. 8 To obtain judicial review of her termination, Jessica
Ryan was required to convince a court that colitis had substantially af-
fected her excretory functions.'8 Plaintiffs who are insufficiently detailed
abled); Gonzales v. Sandoval County, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1442, 1444 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that a
plaintiff need not prove disability to state a claim for prohibited inquiry under ADA). But see
Miller v. City of Springfield, 146 F.3d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1998) (ruling that a nondisabled plaintiff
may not bring ADA claim challenging preemployment medical test).
183. This is especially true of diagnostic criteria for psychiatric conditions. See Stephanie
Proctor Miller, Keeping the Promise: The ADA and Employment Discrimination on the Basis of
Psychiatric Disability, 85 CAL. L. REV. 701, 719 (1997) (arguing that the proof of existence of
some psychiatric disorders should create a presumption of disability under ADA based on func-
tional limitations).
184. See Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[I]mpairment is
to be measured in relation to normalcy or in any event to what the average person does."); Tay-
lor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The determination of
whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the
impairment.., but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual."(quoting
29 C.F.R. 1630.20) app. (1995))).
185. See, e.g., Baxter v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., No. 96 C 2060, 1998 WL 603121 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 4, 1998) (dismissing summarily an ADA claim because the plaintiff failed to produce ad-
missible deposition testimony from his doctor); Kriskovic v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc,, 948 F. Supp.
1355, 1364 (E.D. Wisc. 1996) (dismissing summarily an ADA claim because the plaintiff's doc-
tor's testimony that condition substantially limited his ability to walk was "subjective" and not
corroborated by "objective" medical tests).
186 See, e.g., Hirsch v. National Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977, 982 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(stating that the determination of disability under the ADA must be individualized even if the
plaintiff is afflicted with a disease that is life-threatening or ultimately fatal).
187. See Bancale v. Cox Lumber Co., No. 97-113-CIV-FTM-25D, 1998 WL 469863, at *4
(M.D. Fla. May 18, 1998) ("just because Plaintiff may be diagnosed as legally blind ... it does
not mean he is disabled under the ADA ... he must go beyond mere labels and show that this
impairment substantially affects a major life activity.").
188. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2206-07 (1998). Ms. Abbott testified about her
sexual relations and practices before she became infected with HIV and how her infection with
HIV limited these practices. To prove that the infection substantially limited her ability to re-
produce, Ms. Abbott testified about her plans to have children and the impact of her infection
upon these plans. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 912 F. Supp. 580, 586 (D. Me. 1995).
189. See Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing testi-
mony from plaintiff about how colitis and explosive diarrhea necessitated frequent trips to the
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in describing the nature and effects of their impairment risk summarydismissal.9
The requirement that all plaintiffs claiming discrimination submit to a
detailed and probing judicial inquiry that highlights and particularizes
their impairment serves a number of regressive functions. First, this fre-
quently humiliating process stigmatizes those claiming disability discrimi-
nation and thereby discourages others from seeking legal protection. In
this regard, it is not unlike the means test used to assess eligibility for wel-
fare benefits, which deters applicants by demeaning them and highlight-
ing their dependence.' 9' Indeed, there is evidence that people with dis-
abilities are increasingly doubtful that the ADA will significantly improve
their lives.91
Individualized disability determinations under antidiscrimination law
also perpetuate the notion that there is a diametric relationship between
the disabled and the able body.' 93 To establish disability under antidis-
crimination law, the plaintiff's physical or mental differences from the"normal" body must be construed as defects, inadequacies, oddities, or
failures. On occasion, judges in discrimination cases have unabashedly
used such language to describe disability.! This ritual of constructing the
plaintiff's disability in opposition to the "normal" body and mind serves
to reaffirm the superiority of the able body and the inferiority of disabil-
ity.'95 Indeed, to a follower of French philosopher Michel Foucault, the
bathroom and caused her to soil her clothing at work).
190. See Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry., No. 97-3273, 1999 WL 92255, at*4 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 1999) (holding that plaintiffs must articulate with precision impairment
alleged and affected major life activity to state claim under ADA); Schulter v. Industrial Coils,
Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1446 (W.D. Wisc. 1996) (dismissing summarily plaintiff s claim because,
although she established that she had been repeatedly hospitalized for diabetic reactions to insu-
lin, she had not provided sufficient detail about frequency of hospitalizations, duration of hospi-
talizations, and precise symptoms that had precipitated hospitalizations).
191. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 110, at 118.
192. See Blanck, supra note 4, at 389 (finding that, by 1992, perception among disabled that
ADA would increase access to society had dropped almost to pre-ADA level); National Organi-
zation on Disability, supra note 181 (finding that only 35% of people with disabilities think that
the ADA has had a positive effect on their lives).
193. See David M. Engle, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational Rights
and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 205 (1991) (arguing that the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act, which protects the educational rights of disabled children,
reinforces the belief that children with disabilities are essentially abnormal).
194. See, e.g., EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405, 409 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (stating
that the plaintiff could not be perceived as disabled, because "he did not have a condition-a
defect-that [the employer], based on erroneous social stereotypes, could generalize into an in-
ability to function on the job." (emphasis added)).
195. For a discussion of the relationship between stigmatization and the language of differ-
ence, see JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT Us 66 (1998) ("The meaning of
disability as infirmity/deformity has a long history. This history is testimony to the force of lan-
guage and its power of description ... [This language] provide[s] an ideological mechanism that
subtly but convincingly dehumanizes people."); MINOW, supra note 171, at 112-13 ("Categories
for organizing perception assign differences to some but not others and thus perpetuate or in-
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dedication of antidiscrimination law to probing and cataloging the dis-
abilities of each and every plaintiff suggests a kind of "pleasure" in the
construction of a pathological subject."
Within the structure of disability determinations, the plaintiff's body
is an object to be investigated by lawyers, doctors, and vocational experts,
and ultimately codified by a judge. The position of the plaintiff recalls
that of the patient in a biomedical encounter, who is considered and di-
agnosed according to a set of predetermined categories. 197 This experi-
ence of being the object of the detached curiosity of able-bodied profes-
sionals is likely to be all too familiar to the plaintiff.'9 As Leonard
Kriegel explains,
[I]t is perfectly legitimate to question the cripple about virtually every aspect
of his private life. The normal possesses the right to his voyeurism without
any obligation to involve himself with its object. He wants the picture drawn
for him at the very moment that he refuses to recognize that the subject of
this picture is, like him, a human being .... 199
In its probing of the plaintiff's psyche and body, antidiscrimination
law commonly discounts the plaintiff's own perspective and experi-
ences.2 0 Disability is determined far less by how the plaintiff describes
the impairment's effect on his or her life than by how it is understood by
others ° l-in particular by medical and vocational experts."' One court,
crease disparities of power between groups."); ZOLA, supra note 161, at 237 (arguing that dis-
credited status of disability "is inevitable as long as different than continues to be translated as
less than").
196. For a discussion of the relevance of Michel Foucault's work to disability studies, see
Mitchell & Snyder, supra note 32, at 19 (describing how the work of Michel Foucault can be used
to examine "the pleasurable investments undergirding discourses that reproduce, expand, and
tediously detail taxonomic catalogs of disability's pathological trajectories").
197. For a discussion of the relationship between knowledge and power in the context of the
biomedical encounter, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC 113 (A.M. Sheridan
Smith, trans. 1973) ("[T]he analytical structure is neither produced nor revealed by the picture
itself; the analytical structure preceded the picture, and the correlation between each symptom
and its symptomological value was fixed once and for all in an essential a priori; beneath its ap-
parently analytical function, the picture's only role is to divide up the visible within an already
given conceptual configuration... It makes nothing known; at most, it makes possible recogni-
tion.").
198. The photographs of Diane Arbus and the circus freak show are extreme examples of
the detached fascination of the able-bodied with human impairment. For a discussion of photo-
graphic interrogations of human impairment, see David Hevey, The Enfreakment of Photogra-
phy, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER, supra note 32, at 332.
199 Kriegel, supra note 1, at 421.
200. Disability studies scholars frequently describe the tendency of the able-bodied to dis-
count and silence the perspective of people with disabilities. See, e.g., Fries, supra note 31, at 1
("Throughout history, those who live with disabilities have been defined by the gaze and needs
of the nondisabled world.... We who live with disabilities have been silenced by those who do
not want to hear what we have to say.").
201. The failure of antidiscrimination law to afford adequate weight to the perspective of
people with disabilities, and its tendency to generalize about their lives on the basis of the im-
pairment, is not unique. For an interesting analysis of similar failings within tort law, see Ellen
Pryor Smith, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the III: A Critique of the In-
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for example, refused to credit the plaintiff's sworn testimony that he
could not walk without the aid of a cane or crutches, because it was cor-S •• 203
roborated only by the unsworn statements of two physicians. No matter
how concrete and obvious an impairment's effects on a plaintiff's life,
disability is not acknowledged unless a sufficient degree of "abnormality"
exists in the opinion of able-bodied experts.l
Individualized disability determinations also reproduce the tendency
of the able bodied to perceive people with disabilities as nothing more
than their impairment.205 As one commentator has explained, "too often,
we substitute the disabled part for the whole person. The images are so
powerful they overwhelm all else." 2°  This phenomenon is starkly illus-
trated by the story of an airport encounter between Mary Lou Breslin,
the executive director of a disability rights organization, and an able-
surance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV. 91 (1992) (explaining that theories of tort
compensation rest upon nondisabled persons' fallacious views of disability). For a discussion of
this tendency within sociology, see MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY 139-144
(1996) (describing scholarship critical of the exclusion of disabled perspective from sociological
research).
202. Antidiscrimination law is ambivalent about the appropriate role of medical profession-
als in determining disability. On the one hand, it validates the authority of medicine by placing a
high value on medical evidence of impairment and disability and by embracing an essentialist
biomedical perspective on the nature of disability itself. See supra notes 23-35, 52-53, 65-103 and
accompanying text. On the other hand, antidiscrimination law vests judges, not physicians, with
the ultimate authority to determine disability.
203. See Douglas v. Victor Capital Group, 21 F. Supp. 2d 379, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also
Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, 968 F. Supp. 409, 416 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (crediting plaintiff's testi-
mony regarding symptoms of psychological problem because corroborated by social worker).
204. See Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 723 (2d Cir. 1994) (summarily dismiss-
ing ADA claim because plaintiff did not provide medical evidence that asthma worsened by
poorly ventilated areas); Johnson v. St. Clare's Hosp., No. 96CIV.1425, 1998 WL 236235 at *8
(S.D.N.Y., May 13, 1998) (summarily dismissing ADA claim because plaintiff provided no medi-
cal evidence of alcoholism); McGraw v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1021 (D.
Minn. 1998) (summarily dismissing complaint because no medical evidence supported plaintiff's
claim that her conditions substantially limited her ability to perform a major life activity); Smith
v. DataCard Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1076 (D. Minn. 1998) (summarily dismissing ADA claim
because no medical evidence existed of plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome); Hirsch v. National
Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977, 981-82 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (summarily dismissing ADA claim
because no medical evidence existed to show that plaintiff's cancer substantially limited his daily
life); Farley v. Gibson Container, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 322, 326 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (summarily dis-
missing ADA claim because no medical evidence supported plaintiff's testimony that he could
not lift heavy objects after undergoing hernia surgery); Dotson v. Electro-Wire Prods., Inc., 890
F. Supp. 982, 990, n.2 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that doctor's statement that plaintiff cannot do
hard physical labor was insufficient to corroborate her testimony of the existence of an impair-
ment that substantially limited her ability to work); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc,
869 F. Supp. 736, 744 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (dismissing claim because plaintiff's claims unsupported
by medical evidence).
205. Harlan Hahn attributes this tendency to the centrality of independence and autonomy
to the American identity. See Hahn, supra note 41, at 43 ("In a society that appears to prize lib-
erty more than equality, and that tends to equate freedom with personal autonomy rather than
with the opportunity to exercise meaningful choice, the apprehensions aroused by functional
restrictions resulting from a disability often seem overwhelming.").
206. Gartner & Joe, supra note 29, at 2.
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bodied fellow traveler. As Breslin sat in her wheelchair drinking coffee
and awaiting her flight, the stranger came up and dropped a quarter into
her cup splashing coffee onto Breslin's business suit.
Indeed, plaintiffs who wish to persuade a judge that they are disabled
have no choice but to portray their impairment-in all its corporeal de-
tail-as the central and defining feature of their identity and daily lives."8
Plaintiffs who make the mistake of revealing a self-perception that is not
so defined, or who characterize their impairment as anything less than
crippling, are summarily dismissed, along with their story of unequal
treatment at the hands of the defendant.2°
The demand of antidiscrimination law that plaintiffs portray their im-
pairment as all-defining reflects and reinforces the imagined misery of the
disabled life.210 At the same time, this requirement conflicts with the les-
son that people with disabilities have been taught throughout their lives:
to avoid focusing on their disability, to overcome their limitations, and to
develop an identity that is distinct from their impairment.21' In a culture
207. See SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 19.
208. For a discussion of how the disability determination process for social security benefits
similarly demands a one-dimensional identity from claimants, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled
Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 811 (1992) (describing how the eligibility re-
quirements for widows' disability benefits inhibit counter-narratives that reveal autonomy or
community).
209. See, e.g., Sackett v. WPNT, Inc., 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1597, 1600 (W.D. Pa.
1995), affd, 91 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that a plaintiff's failure to apply for Social Secu-
rity benefits and to indicate on his job applications that he was disabled contradicts his claim of
disability under the ADA); Reeder v. Frank, 813 F. Supp. 773, 781 (D. Utah 1992) (regarding a
plaintiff with a speech disorder as not disabled in part because he had not declared himself
"disabled" on his employment application form).
210. See Harlan Hahn, Advertising the Acceptably Employable Image: Disability and Capi-
talism, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER, supra note 32, at 172, 183-184 (discussing the pre-
dominant assumption among the able-bodied that the functional impairment is the central con-
cern of the disabled). The "imagined misery" of the disabled life may also underlie judicial
skepticism about claims of disability under antidiscrimination law if the plaintiff retains the abil-
ity to engage in recreational activities, which are presumed to be the exclusive domain of the
healthy and able-bodied. See, e.g., Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 723 (2d Cir. 1994)
(commenting that the plaintiff's participation in recreation activities cast doubts on whether her
asthma substantially limited her ability to breathe); South v. NMC Homecare, Inc., 943 F. Supp.
1336, 1341 (D. Kan. 1996) (contending that the plaintiff's use of treadmill at the gym undermines
his claims that asthma is a disability); Fuqua v. Unisys Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1201, 1206 (D. Minn.
1989) (arguing that evidence that the plaintiff participates in recreational activities may under-
mine the finding of a disability).
211. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 7 (arguing that many people with disabilities do not
see themselves as part of a minority group because of a desire to "avoid the taint accompanying
that label"); ZOLA, supra note 161, at 206 ("The very process of successful adaptation not only
involves divesting ourselves of any identification with being handicapped, but also denying the
uncomfortable features of that life."); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil
Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities,
40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, n.53 (1993) ("The true overcomer is expected to minimize the evidence
of her disability, not the impact the disability has on her life. It is most important to look able-
bodied. Integrating a disability into one's life by making one's home accessible is treated as less
worthy of admiration than learning to walk up the stairs of an inaccessible home.").
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pervaded by the rhetoric of overcoming-by stories of individuals with
disabilities who realize goals that are exceptional for the able bodied-
people with disabilities are encouraged to develop a self-perception that
is totally at odds with the one demanded by antidiscrimination law. 12
Harlan Hahn explains,
Persons with disabilities often are understandably reluctant to focus on that
aspect of their identity that is most negatively stigmatized by the rest of soci-
ety .... Obviously, people may experience difficulty in developing a sense of
identity with an attribute of themselves that they have been taught to"overcome." 213
Given this dissonance between the demands of the culture and the de-
mands of antidiscrimination law, it is hardly surprising that plaintiffs
claiming discrimination may be ambivalent about describing themselves
214as disabled.
The contradictions embodied in disability discrimination law give rise
to a final irony. In claiming discrimination, plaintiffs are asserting their
fundamental equality with the able-bodied and their right to be treated
with an equal measure of dignity. Yet at this very same moment, antidis-
crimination law demands of them a performance designed to highlight
their difference-their "abnormality." Indeed, the requirement that
plaintiffs dramatize their impairment in order to gain the recognition of
antidiscrimination law returns individuals with disabilities to their tradi-
tional role within the biomedical model of establishing entitlement to
benefits through the evocation of sympathy and pity.2" This in itself rein-
forces the superiority of the able-bodied and the separateness and de-. 211
pendence of the disabled.
212. The depoliticizing effects of the rhetoric of the disabled hero-the overcomer-is a fre-
quent subject of disability studies scholarship. See, e.g., LINTON, supra note 23, at 18 ("The ideas
embedded in the overcoming rhetoric are of personal triumph over a personal condition. The
idea that someone can overcome a disability has not been generated within the community; it is a
wish fulfillment generated from the outside." (emphasis omitted)); ZOLA, supra note 161, at 204-
05 (arguing that stories of overcomers send the message that if people like Franklin Delano
Roosevelt can overcome their handicaps so can all the disabled, and the failure to do so repre-
sents a personal failing); Wendell, supra note 32, at 271 ("The image of the disabled hero may
reduce the 'otherness' of a few disabled people, but because it creates an ideal which most dis-
abled people cannot meet, it increases the 'otherness' of the majority of disabled people.").
213. Hahn, supra note 47, at 310.
214. See, e.g., Olbrot v. Denny's, Inc., No. 97 C 1578, 1998 WL 525174, at *1 (N.D. I11. Aug.
19, 1998) (noting that in response to a question about whether she considered herself disabled,
plaintiff with cancer had stated, "I'm not disabled where I cannot work, no.... I did my job
good."); Sacket v. WPNT, Inc., 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1597, 1600 (W.D. Pa. 1995), affd,
91 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that a plaintiff with crossed eyes had not described himself as
disabled on job applications); Reeder v. Frank, 813 F. Supp. 773, 781 (D. Utah 1992) (noting that
a plaintiff with a speech impediment had not declared himself disabled on his job application).
215. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
216. See BICKENBACH, supra note 18, at 196 ("Whatever the form ... charity creates a rela-
tionship between giver and receiver that is inherently unequal and demeaning.").
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B. The Depoliticizing Effect of the Category offDisability in
Antidiscrimination Law
Until the 1970s, most individuals with disabilities did not consider
themselves to be members of an oppressed minority group. Instead, they
tended to understand themselves and their marginalized status in accor-
dance with the biomedical model, which located the source of their social• • .217
and economic problems in the impairment. Consistent with this view,
the political and economic interests of the disabled were advanced by
separate impairment-based associations, such as those representing the
blind or children with muscular dystrophy.218 These organizations often
competed for government largesse, each attempting to prove that the
constituency it represented suffered from the most severe impairment
and was therefore the most deserving of public aid.219
Since then, there has been a significant transformation in how people
with disabilities perceive themselves and their social and economic cir-
220cumstances. Specifically, many have come to recognize that all people
with disabilities share similar experiences of social exclusion and stigma-e • • .221
tization regardless of impairment. Having rejected the culture's fixation
on the particularities of impairment and concentrated instead on their
shared history, people with disabilities now increasingly view themselves
22as members of a single minority group.
The emergence of this collective identity precipitated a rejection of
the impairment-based approach to political advocacy. In its place, advo-
cates for people with disabilities adopted a rights-based minority group
model based on the premise that all individuals with disabilities, regard-
less of impairment, are entitled to dignity, equal treatment, and full social
217. See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
218. For a discussion of the history of advocacy for the disabled, see SHAPIRO, supra note 3,
at 41-75; Scotch & Berkowitz, supra note 36, at 9-14 (describing political strategies employed by
advocates for the blind).
219. See Funk, supra note 28, at 12 (describing tendency of impairment-based advocacy
groups to perpetuate charity approach to disability).
220. See Hahn, supra note 28, at 185 (attributing emergence of "minority group model" to
increased studies of effects of disability and growing political movement of disabled persons).
221. For a discussion of this shifting self-perception among people with disabilities, see
SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 11 (describing emergence of group consciousness among people with
disabilities).
222. See SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 24 (discussing 1985 poll finding that 74% of disabled re-
spondents say they share a "common identity" with other disabled people and 45% say they are
a minority group.); Funk, supra note 28, at 14 (describing growing recognition among people
with disabilities during 60's and 70's that they "had rights, could choose, belong, and participate
as full and equal members of society"); Hahn, supra note 47, at 299 (1985) (discussing increased
willingness of disabled to form a cohesive political force to challenge their shared status in soci-
ety); National Organization on Disability, supra note 182, at 7 (finding that 52% of adults with
disabilities surveyed in 1998 and 40% of adults with disabilites surveyed in 1986 have a "strong
sense of common identity" with other people with disabilities).
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• • 223inclusion. Refusing to see themselves as deserving of public charity in
direct proportion to the severity of their conditions, people with disabili-
ties transformed themselves into a unified political movement that de-
manded and won legal reforms during an era of civil rights retrench-
ment.224
However, contradictions within antidiscrimination law counteract
these developments. For example, the practice of determining disability
on an individualized basis undermines a sustained political consciousness
among people with disabilities and, in turn, undermines a unified disabil-
ity rights movement. 5 Unlike all other antidiscrimination laws, those
protecting the disabled do not treat plaintiffs as members of a class that is
automatically protected because society has made a commitment to
226eradicating the lingering effects of historical victimization. Nor does
disability discrimination law adopt the far less radical approach of recog-
nizing plaintiffs with specific types of impairments, such as AIDS, cancer,
or deafness, as members of a per se protected class. 27 Instead, the law
constructs disability discrimination as an ahistorical, impairment-
dependent phenomenon that can only be determined on a case-by-casebasis."
This discourse of individual impairment in antidiscrimination law en-
223. See SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 14 ("People with disabilities are demanding rights, not
medical cures."); Funk, supra note 28, at 17-23 (describing development of coalitions and organi-
zations created by and designed to educate and advocate on behalf of disabled adults and chil-
dren). For a global perspective on the disability rights movement, see CHARLTON, supra note
195, at 130-149.
224. See SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 126 (describing unifying effect of struggle to enact ADA
on groups that advocated for rights of the disabled).
225. For a discussion of the centrality of a categorical discourse to achieving gender equality,
see Angela Harris, Categorical Discourse and Dominance Theory, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
181, 183 (1989) (stating that the role of categorical discourse in attaining gender equality is "...
to get women to stop thinking of themselves as individuals who happen to be female and to start
thinking of themselves as individual members of the class 'women"') (reviewing CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989)). For a discussion of this
issue with respect to racial equality, see Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race:
Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 23-24
(1994) (arguing that rhetoric of the individual denies structural and institutional components of
race and racism).
226. See Burgdorf, supra note 49, at 442 ("In contrast, other types of civil rights laws do not
require establishing membership in a protected class. These statutes focus on the discriminatory
acts that occur, not the qualities of the person discriminated against."); Locke, supra note 9, at
114 ("While under other antidiscrimination statutes the criterion that the plaintiff must be a
member of the protected class is generally taken for granted, a plaintiff suing under the ADA
must prove her membership.").
227. See Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., 91 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A disability
determination ... should not be based on abstract lists or categories of impairments, as there are
varying degrees of impairments .... "); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986)
(stating that application of definition of disabled under FRA cannot be accomplished through
abstract lists and categories of impairments; inquiry must be individualized).
228. See supra Subsection II.B.
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courages people with disabilities to once again locate the origins of their
marginalized social status and material inequality in their own impair-
ment rather than in the organization of society. Antidiscrimination law
further militates against political consciousness by conveying the message
that it is impossible for plaintiffs with impairments that are anything less
than crippling to be subjected to discrimination-no matter how unmis-
takable and blatant their unequal treatment . 2 29 By denying the existence
of discrimination, except in cases of severe functional impairment, anti-
discrimination law masks both discrete instances of discrimination-even
when directly experienced by the individual-and the pervasiveness of
disability bias within society as a whole.
Antidiscrimination law also counteracts a unified disability rights
movement by emphasizing impairment-based divisions among the dis-
abled. By refusing to acknowledge as disabled all but a small number of
individuals, the restrictive category of disability severely reduces the
number of impaired and ill people who can, without contradiction, iden-
tify themselves as members of this minority group. Indeed, during its
1998-99 term, the Supreme Court seemed to officially cap membership in
230this minority group at 43 million.
The dichotomizing rhetoric of the deserving and the undeserving dis-
abled also pits people with disabilities against each other for entitlement
231to guarantees of nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodation.
Thus, while recognition as a protected class under civil rights laws gener-
ally reinforces a group's collective identity, antidiscrimination law en-
courages people with disabilities once again to view each other as con-
testants for the benevolence of the able bodied majority.232
229. See supra notes 65-176 and accompanying text.
230. In Sutton v. United Air Lines, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999), the Court concluded that the
ADA was not intended to cover individuals whose impairments are successfully treated, because
such an interpretation would expand the protected class beyond the numerical estimate of dis-
abled Americans stated in the findings section of the statute. See id. at 2147-49 (referring to 42
U.S.C. §12101(a)(1), which states that, "some 43 million Americans have one or more physical
or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as whole is growing
older."). As Justice Stevens points out in his dissent, this is a rather odd analysis, considering that
the Court had no difficulty construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to protect Cauca-
sians, a group that was clearly beyond Congress' concern in enacting this statute. See id. at 2157
(Stevens, J., Breyer, J., dissenting).
231. During Congressional hearings on the ADA, Representative Dannemeyer explicitly
sought, without success, to encourage a witness-a Korean war veteran with paraplegia, to see
himself as more deserving of the statute's protection than individuals with other impairments,
such as alcoholism, drug abuse, and HIV infection. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW
101-336: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, at 1877-80 (1991).
232. One critic of the ADA predicted that the statute would strengthen the group identity
and political strength of the disabled, which, in his view, was negative. See Oi, supra note 167, at
45 ("A poorly defined and fragmented target population of disabled individuals who are told
that they are entitled to jobs, access, and disability benefits could emerge as a cohesive, articu-
late, and vocal minority who will become increasingly dependent upon the federal government
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C. The Legitimizing Effect of the Category of Disability in
Antidiscrimination Law
The category of disability perpetuates inequality by legitimizing many
manifestations of disability bias while creating the appearance of a soci-
ety that is fair in its treatment of the disabled."' Most significantly, anti-
discrimination law is completely indifferent to even the most flagrant acts
of disability bias unless visited upon an individual who is severely im-
paired.2 4 Indeed, the category of disability ensures that many decisions
and institutional criteria that discriminate on the basis of impairment or
illness escape judicial scrutiny entirely.235 One recent study found that, in
about one out of five decisions under Title I of the ADA, courts com-
pletely avoided consideration of the legality of the defendant's conduct
by summarily dismissing the case on the ground that the plaintiff was not
disabled. 23' Antidiscrimination law also legitimizes inequality on the basis
of disability by upholding the authority of employers to enforce standards
of appearance in the workplace that marginalize people with disabilities.
Under the ADA, an employer's prerogative to discriminate against em-
ployees whose visible impairment prevents them from conforming to
prevailing norms is limited only if the impairment is immutable, and then
only if it substantially limits a major life activity. 237 Individuals with im-
pairments that severely mar their appearance but do not produce severe
functional limitations, and individuals with impairments that only affect
their appearance, are denied the protection of antidiscrimination law.238
for their continued well-being.").
233. See Freeman, supra note 14, at 1107 ("Placing the existing societal institutions and prac-
tices beyond the reach of the violation concept tends to legitimize those institutions and practices
234. Antidiscrimination law's lack of concern for disability bias as long as it is expressed to-
ward individuals whose impairments are not considered sufficiently severe is analogous to de-
nying relief to a light-skinned African-American who is subjected to racism or to a nonobservant
Jew who is subjected to anti-Semitism. As Professor Robert Burgdorf has rightly argued, by fo-
cusing on the authenticity of the victim rather than on the fairness of the perpetrator's act, the
narrow definition of disability negates the social justice objective of civil rights law. See Burgdorf,
supra note 9, at 568 ("Nondiscrimination is a guarantee of equality. It is not a special service re-
served for the select few.").
235. Indeed, as one commentator has noted, the more irrational and idiosyncratic an em-
ployer's belief about an impairment, the more likely it will escape judicial review under the "one
job is not enough" rule. See Mayerson, supra note 9, at 599.
236. See American Bar Association, supra note 177, at 403. The results of this study refute
the early prediction of one commentator that the ADA's individualized disability determination
process would make it difficult for defendants to obtain summary judgment. See Thomas H. Bar-
nard, Disabling America: Costing Out the Americans with Disabilities Act, 2 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 41, 48 (1992) (predicting that ADA's case-by-case structure and minimal showing
necessary to survive motion for summary judgment would make it difficult for defendants to ob-
tain this relief).
237. See supra notes 91-98, 113-132 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Van Sickle v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., No. 97-1255, 1998 WL 863707,
at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 23, 1998) (holding that plaintiff with facial scar is not disabled under the
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In the case of Talanda v. KFC National Management Co.,239 Paul Ta-
landa, the manager of a fast food restaurant, hired Dorothy Bellson as a
customer service worker. He did so despite the fact that many of her
teeth were missing, because she had the necessary qualifications-prior
experience and an outgoing, friendly personality.240 After a visit from a
supervisor from corporate headquarters, however, Talanda was ordered
to reassign Bellson because of her "unprofessional appearance., 24' Ta-
landa refused to carry out this directive, viewing it as morally wrong and
a violation of antidiscrimination law. Eventually, he was discharged for
insubordination.242
In assessing whether he had a stated claim of retaliatory discharge
under the ADA, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals began by exam-
ining whether Talanda's belief that he was opposing discrimination was"reasonable., 243 The court concluded that Talanda could not reasonably
have believed that he was opposing unlawful discrimination, because
Bellson's impairment was not substantially limiting-and therefore disa-
bling-within the meaning of the ADA.24
By empowering employers to discriminate against qualified workers
like Ms. Bellson, who have visible impairments that do not substantially
limit a major life activity-and against their workplace defenders like Mr.
Talanda-disability discrimination law reinforces the larger role of the
labor market in enforcing cultural standards of appearance that them-
selves contribute to the marginalized status of the disabled.4 5 Disability
studies scholars argue that a significant source of disability bias is
"aesthetic anxiety," an aversion toward individuals whose physical ap-
246pearance differs markedly from the cultural norm. As Harlan Hahn ex-
ADA); Talanda v. KFC Management Co., 140 F.3d 1090, 1097 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that per-
son whose appearance is marred by missing front teeth is not disabled under ADA); Lindloff v.
Schenectady Int'l, 972 F. Supp. 393, 395 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that leukoderma, which
caused loss of pigmentation on skin on various parts of plaintiff's body, is not disability); Gray v.
Ameritech Corp., 937 F. Supp. 762, 769 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that plaintiff with psoriasis that
produced white, flaking sores on her face and body is not disabled under ADA).
239. 140 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1998).
240. See id. at 1092.
241. The supervisor stated that, because of her missing teeth, the counter worker did not
project a "professional image." Id. at 1092, n.2.
242. See id. at 1094.
243. Id. at 1096-97.
244. See id. at 1098.
245. See, e.g., Van Sickle v. Automatic Data Processing, No. 97-1255, 1998 WL 863707 (6th
Cir. Nov. 23, 1998) (affirming the dismissal of an ADA claim by a plaintiff who alleged that the
employer repeatedly referred to him as "scar face" in the presence of customers, and ultimately
terminated his employment); Christian v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., 117 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th Cir.
1997) (stating that it is not a violation of the ADA to fire an employee with an unsightly skin dis-
ease because the employer is revolted by her appearance).
246. This analysis is supported by an extensive body of social science literature finding that
favorable treatment is regularly afforded to individuals who are considered physically attractive
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plains, "discrimination directed at disabled individuals is partly due to
their being devalued because they do not present conventional images of
human physique or behavior., 247 Since these visible differences are often
understood to reflect biological inferiority, the subordination of the dis-
abled appears natural.' 48 The indifference of disability discrimination law
to workplace standards of appearance permits the labor market to per-
petuate majoritarian norms that stigmatize visibly impaired individuals.249
Disability discrimination law is arguably less just in its treatment of
individuals discriminated against because of appearance than civil rights
laws protecting other groups. For example, it is a violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act to establish appearance requirements that discrimi-
nate on the basis of a characteristic that is immutably linked to race, gen-
der, or national origin.2' ° This body of law recognizes the injustice of de-
nying employment to a qualified applicant solely because of an innate
211characteristic that he or she is powerless to alter. In contrast, when an
in cultural terms. See generally ELAINE HATFIELD & SUSAN SPRECHER, MIRROR, MIRROR:
THE IMPORTANCE OF LOOKS IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1986); GORDON. L. PATZER, THE PHYSICAL
ATTRACTIVENESS PHENOMENON (1985); Ellen Berscheid & Elaine Walster, Physical Attractive-
ness, 14 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 157-214 (1974). Some commentators
completely ignore this source of bias toward people with disabilities to rationalize the exclusion
of all but the severely impaired from the protections of the ADA. See, e.g., Harris, supra note
163, at 595 (asserting, without any empirical support, that disability bias originates from the "fact
that [individuals with disabilities] are substantially limited in some fundamental aspect of living
compared with the average person").
247. Hahn, supra note 41, at 44. Until recently, this "aesthetic anxiety" found expression in
statutes that prohibited individuals with an "ugly" or "unsightly" appearance from appearing in
public. See Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination
on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2035 n.2 (1987). Currently, some
antidiscrimination statutes include appearance as a prohibited basis for discrimination. See, e.g.,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512(a) (1981).
248. Hahn, supra note 28, at 192 (discussing the widespread assumption that disabilities are
a reflection of biological inferiority that makes the subordination of the disabled appear natural).
249. See HYDE, supra note 14, at 78 (describing the labor market as the most powerful social
mechanism for disciplining and dominating the body); Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation
of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395, 1398 (1992) ("The primary social function
of appearance law is to empower employers, school officials, judges, and other authority figures
to enforce the dominant expectations about appearance and to discipline deviance from the ap-
proved social norms.").
250. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating
that equal employment opportunity may be secured only if employers do not discriminate
against employees on basis of immutable characteristics).
251. See id. at 1091("[Ilf the employee objects to the grooming code he has the right to re-
ject it by looking elsewhere for employment, or alternatively he may choose to subordinate his
preference by accepting the code along with the job."). Of course, this rationale for denying the
protection of antidiscrimination to individuals with mutable differences in their appearance itself
legitimizes irrational and biased conduct and reaffirms the hegemonic role of the labor market
by empowering employers to require that employees who can control their appearance do so to
conform with majoritarian norms. For an extensive discussion and critique of appearance law,
see Klare, supra note 249, at 1318. Mari Matsuda has argued that antidiscrimination law ought to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of both mutable and immutable characteristics. See Matsuda,
supra note 171, at 1400 ("A true antisubordination agenda would apply reasonable accommoda-
tion to all differences, whether chosen or immutable, that are historically subject to exploitation
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employer discriminates against a qualified employee because of a condi-
tion that, while in no way affecting his or her ability to do the job, results
in an unacceptable physical appearance, disability discrimination law has
not been violated-unless the employee is substantially functionally im-
paired.2 For many visibly impaired employees who experience discrimi-
nation due to their appearance, disability discrimination law thus affords
only one course of action: to find employment elsewhere.
At the same time that it deems many manifestations of disability bias
to be nonviolations, antidiscrimination law encourages the perception
that society is already fair, responsive, and rational in its treatment of
people with disabilities. By affording protections to so few, it suggests
that discrimination on the basis of disability is a minor, relatively rare
phenomenon-the exception rather than the norm. This construction le-
gitimizes the legal system by making it appear capable of eliminating the
seemingly limited problem of disability bias through individualized adju-
dication.
Moreover, by protecting and affording accommodations to those peo-
ple with disabilities who deviate most dramatically and visibly from ma-
joritarian norms, the law contributes to the appearance of a society and
labor market that are singularly concerned with merit and highly respon-
sive to the needs of the disabled. Eventually, the ADA's success in elimi-
nating the most overt manifestations of disability bias may serve to un-
dermine majoritarian support for the cause of disability rights by
encouraging the belief that society has done everything it can to address
the problems faced by people with disabilities.253
V. CONCLUSION
Formal legal rights protecting the disabled have undoubtedly height-
ened public awareness and improved the lives of some individuals with
disabilities. However, these gains have not come without costs to the ul-
timate goal of ending inequality based on disability. The judiciary's insis-
tence upon viewing disability as an essential, biomedical fact-and its re-
sistance to adopting a social political perspective-has led to the
construction of a highly restrictive category of disability that reserves the
law's protection for the relatively few who fit the American disabled
or oppression by dominant groups."). For an interesting judicial discussion of the injustice of
permitting discrimination on the basis of a mutable physical characteristic, see the dissenting
opinions of Justices Douglas and Marshall in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
252. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
253. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw has persuasively argued that the elimination of overt
manifestations of race discrimination and the rhetoric of formal racial equality have convinced
many in the majority that the problem of racism is a thing of the past thereby undermining their
support for civil rights movement. See Crenshaw, supra note 16, at 1347-48.
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ideal-men and women who struggle for independence and self-support
despite the most incapacitating of impairments. In addition to upholding
the deeply held values of individualism and self-reliance, this category en-
forces an oppressive set of expectations on the vast ranks of the "merely
ill" who are excluded from its bounds: they must rise above their impair-
ment or illness, meet the demands of the workplace and the physical en-
vironment, and bear the consequences of an inability to do so-and of
any resulting discriminatory treatment-on their own.
Instead of informing and advancing a public dialogue about the myr-
iad ways in which people with mental and physical differences are treated
unfairly, the narrow category of disability fosters a distorted understand-
ing of the origins and prevalence of disability bias even as it legitimizes
many of the ways in which that bias is expressed.
While assessing the effect of an impairment upon whether an individ-
ual can perform certain life activities may be appropriate in certain con-
texts, it sheds no light whatsoever on whether a person possesses-or has
been perceived to possess-a physical or mental difference that may have
caused him or her to be subjected to social stigma and injustice. 54 The
major life activity criterion, and particularly its narrow interpretation by
the courts, rests upon the rationalist assumption that individuals with im-
pairments that do not impose severe functional limitations will not elicit
bias, because bias necessarily arises from misjudging a person's capaci-
ties. However, this assumption is contradicted by studies of disability bias
and the recent history of early public reactions to people with HIV infec-
tion. Both of these demonstrate that discrimination on the basis of physi-
cal or mental difference often originates in complex unconscious my-
thologies that have nothing to do with misunderstanding an impairment's
functional effects.255
According to disability studies scholars, a far more common motive
for stigmatization and exclusion based on mental or physical difference is
a desire among the healthy and able bodied to avoid confronting the fun-
damental-and fundamentally unalterable-vulnerability of the human
body. One commentator explains, "the disabled body is always the re-
254. From a practical standpoint, the capacity of antidiscrimination law to identify and rem-
edy instances of disability bias would be significantly enhanced by a definition of disability that
required only that the plaintiff have an actual or perceived mental or physical impairment.
255. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 n.12 (1987) (stating that, "[t]he isolation of
the chronically ill and of those perceived to be ill or contagious appears across cultures and cen-
turies, as does the development of complex and often pernicious mythologies about the nature,
cause, and transmission of illness."); Hahn, supra note 18, at 49-50 (discussing sociological re-
search on disability bias); Hahn, supra note 47, at 304-09 (suggesting that main sources of dis-
ability bias are "aesthetic anxiety," which is the aversion to persons with a "deviant" physical
appearance, and "existential anxiety," which is the sense of one's own physical vulnerability that
is triggered by an encounter with a person who is disabled).
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minder of the body about to come apart at the seams. It provides a vision
of, a caution about, the body as a construct held together willfully, always
threatening to become its individual parts-cells, organs, limbs, percep-
tions .... ",256 Ending inequality based on disability, therefore, will depend
on society's embrace of a far more inclusive concept of justice and a
much broader emancipatory vision than the one embodied in antidis-
crimination law.
256. Lennerd J. Davis, Nude Venuses, Medusa's Body, and Phantom Limbs: Disability and
Visuality, in THE BODY AND PHYSICAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 32, at 51, 55.

